| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The web administration panel binds broadly to the public IPv6 address space on port [::]:8080 without default firewall limits, making internal API endpoints reachable over the WAN. |
| The registration path /v1/account/register provides no bot mitigation mechanisms, allowing malicious automated systems to flood the database. |
| Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect OTA application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers. This allows unauthorized actors to list catalog items and extract protected binaries from pre-signed cloud links. |
| The /v1/Plan service relies entirely on a shared global API token for full administrative management, allowing arbitrary creation of zero-cost network access plans. |
| The upload.cgi binary, responsible for processing device backups, contains a hardcoded AES encryption key. This allows an attacker to decrypt, modify, and re-encrypt system backups, facilitating persistent backdoor injection. |
| Improper access control in the MQTT broker allows wildcard topic subscriptions, exposing all MQTT traffic to unauthorized actors. |
| Web endpoints intended for the Acer Connect app improperly validate the HTTP Authorization header, failing to block requests when Base64 decoding fails. |
| The Wi-Fi device blocking feature fails to sanitize MAC address input, allowing injection and execution of arbitrary shell commands. |
| Unauthenticated Debug Service. The /sbin/mtk_dut binary is exposed on TCP port 9000 without authentication, allowing any LAN-based attacker to execute arbitrary UCC commands. |
| The acer_cgi.log file in the device firmware is accessible without authentication via the web interface. This file contains cleartext login credentials (for web and Telnet), leading to unauthorized system access. |
| The FieldX MDM adb messaging topic passes unverified payloads directly into Runtime.exec(), allowing command/instruction injection. |
| The local MQTT broker does not enforce topic-level Access Control Lists (ACLs). This allows any client to subscribe using wildcard characters (# or +) to enumerate hidden network devices or publish rogue control commands. |
| The hard-coded APK resource files never expire, and the shared scepter leads to information leaks and potential misuse. |
| The ai_cmd utility executes with full root permissions. It pipes socket inputs directly to popen(), paving the way for unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary root commands. |
| Unchecked public access permissions on a core Broadcast Receiver allow unauthorized local software components to invoke administrative operations. |
| The system fails to evaluate instructional permissions over multiple internal operation codes (opcodes), permitting unauthorized application installations or command executions. |
| The production build of the M3WebServer hard-codes its backend API keys, which can be easily intercepted through verbose error handling pages. |
| The summary service endpoint suffers from an IDOR vulnerability where it fails to verify user ownership of hardware serial numbers, exposing device data to scraping. |
| Overly permissive configuration settings on cloud storage containers expose active telemetry information publicly to the internet. |
| The debugging routine SCREEN_CLICK(5053) enables a connection to skip the standard device login prompt entirely and directly enter an interactive shell interface. |
