| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| vm2 before 3.11.8 contains an incomplete fix for Error.cause sanitization that allows sandbox escape when revisited host-wrapped AggregateError objects are caught within a single exception handler traversal. Attackers can exploit cycle detection bypass in handleException to access unsanitized host proxies embedded in the errors array, enabling full remote code execution and process information disclosure from the sandbox. |
| A permissions issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7. A malicious application may be able to access restricted files. |
| CMAK through 3.0.0.6 fails to apply the scheduled leader election feature toggle to HTML form routes, allowing attackers to bypass the feature gate. Attackers can access the form endpoints to start and stop the recurring election scheduler, disrupting leadership across managed Kafka clusters. |
| A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27. An app may be able to bypass Gatekeeper checks. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, codeMode in src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts executes untrusted JavaScript with new Function() inside with(sandbox) and relies on a small source-code blocklist plus shadowed process and require properties. Code can use ({}).constructor.constructor to recover the real Function constructor, obtain process and process.mainModule.require, and reach host filesystem and subprocess APIs despite the advertised sandbox. Attackers who control codeMode input can read secrets, modify files, execute commands, or exhaust the host process. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2. |
| vm2 is a sandbox for running untrusted JavaScript. In vm2 versions up to and including 3.11.3, the defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace function in lib/setup-sandbox.js builds its output array using prototype-walking index assignment (lines[lines.length] = value) rather than a prototype-bypassing define-property primitive. Because this bridge-internal array is allocated in the sandbox realm, code inside the sandbox can install an accessor on Array.prototype for the relevant index; the accessor is then invoked whenever the sandbox reads error.stack (or otherwise triggers Error.prepareStackTrace), allowing sandbox code to observe and intercept each stack-trace line written by the bridge. The same pattern is used in the error-handling (catch) branch. The values written are formatted strings only, so the practical impact is limited to an information side channel and a violation of vm2's bridge-container defense invariant rather than a sandbox escape; the vendor rates the issue Low. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.4, which installs each entry as an own data property via Reflect.defineProperty. |
| vm2 before 3.11.8 does not fully enforce the allowAsync: false option in VM and NodeVM. While localPromise.prototype.then is replaced with a handler that throws 'Async not available', the sandbox's Promise static methods (Promise.resolve, Promise.all, Promise.race, Promise.any, and Promise.allSettled) still assimilate attacker-supplied thenables: native promise resolution performs PromiseResolveThenableJob and invokes the sandboxed code's then method in a microtask without passing through the patched then, so the async restriction is never applied. As a result, sandboxed script can schedule work that runs after VM.run() or NodeVM.run() has returned and outside the configured timeout, continuing to execute after the host believes execution is complete. |
| vm2 versions 3.10.1 through 3.11.6 contain a sandbox escape reachable from a default `new VM()` sandbox when running on Node.js 26. WebAssembly.compileStreaming and WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming can produce a raw host-realm Promise that rejects with a host-realm error object; by controlling Symbol.species via Promise.prototype.finally, sandbox code receives that raw host error, walks from the host error constructor to the host Function constructor, and recovers the real host `process` object, gaining host Node.js capabilities (e.g. access to host modules such as fs) in the context of the process running the sandbox. No NodeVM, require permission, host object injection, or otherwise unsafe configuration is required. This is a bypass of the fix for GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q, which removed the JSPI entry points WebAssembly.promising and WebAssembly.Suspending. The issue is fixed in 3.11.7. |
| vm2 versions >= 3.9.6 and <= 3.11.6 are affected by a NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass that permits a sandbox escape on Node.js 24 and newer when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin (e.g. require: { builtin: ['node:test'] }). On Node.js 24+, module.builtinModules exposes the scheme-only key node:test, which is not covered by vm2's family-based DANGEROUS_BUILTINS protection, so it is stored in the generic host-passthrough loader. Because requireImpl() in lib/setup-node-sandbox.js strips a single 'node:' prefix before the builtin lookup, sandbox code calling require('node:node:test') resolves to the stored node:test key and receives a readonly proxy to the host module. Calls to node:test.run() are forwarded to the host implementation, which spawns a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and passes through attacker-controlled execArgv values; supplying --eval=<JavaScript> therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process outside the NodeVM sandbox. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7. |
| vm2 versions 3.10.2 through 3.11.6 contain a sandbox escape vulnerability on Node.js 26 where Promise.prototype.finally() bypasses vm2's wrapper protections due to a stale PromiseThenLookupChain protector in V8 14.6. Attackers can exploit this by creating an async function that returns a Promise with an attacker-controlled constructor Symbol.species, allowing them to reach the host Function constructor and process object for arbitrary code execution. |
| vm2 versions 3.11.3 through 3.11.6 expose Node.js's host node:sqlite module to code running in NodeVM when that builtin is permitted, either explicitly or through builtin: ['*']. The module is wrapped with vm.readonly(), which prevents property assignment but leaves host-authority callables reachable; in addition, the resolver treats any request starting with 'node:' as a core-module request and the runtime strips only one 'node:' prefix, so a sandbox request for 'node:node:sqlite' resolves to the configured node:sqlite entry. Sandboxed code can therefore create an in-memory DatabaseSync with extension loading enabled and call DatabaseSync.loadExtension() on a native library bundled in the untrusted plugin package (path derived from __dirname). SQLite loads the library into the Node.js host process and invokes its native entry point, giving the sandboxed plugin arbitrary native code execution outside the sandbox with the host process's privileges. The issue is fixed in vm2 3.11.7. |
| In multiple functions of fpc_tee_hal.c, there is a possible use-after-free due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In ac_init_one_sswrp of init.c, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In multiple locations, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In gsa_sw_pk_hash_compare of image-auth-srv.c, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In ac_init_policy of init.c, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In multiple locations, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In VPU, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In IP Multimedia Subsystem, there is a possible authentication bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In enable_segment of remap.c, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
