| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| @fastify/proxy-addr is a Fastify plugin that determines a request's client address behind trusted reverse proxies, and it backs Fastify request.ip and request.ips. In versions 3.0.0 through 5.1.0, a trust subnet written in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation with an IPv4-sized prefix, such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 instead of the correct ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, is accepted without error but trusts every IPv4 address on the internet rather than the block it names. Because the socket peer then becomes trusted at hop 0, any unauthenticated client can supply an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header and control the address the application reads, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. The plugin inherited this defect from the upstream proxy-addr module (CVE-2026-90711). The issue is fixed in @fastify/proxy-addr 5.1.1, and users should upgrade to 5.1.1 or later. As a workaround, ensure any IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet uses a prefix length of at least 97, or express the range in plain IPv4 notation. |
| djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, djust's per-object authorization (`get_object` + `has_object_permission`, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket mount and event paths but not on three other render entry points: (a) the initial HTTP GET render, (b) SPA `url_change` navigation, and (c) `{% live_render %}` embedded child views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child — a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. All render entry points now route through a shared `enforce_object_permission` chokepoint: HTTP GET returns 403, `url_change` emits a `permission_denied` frame and skips the render, and `{% live_render %}` (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom `get_object` are unaffected (no-op). No reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched. |
| The ca-certificates package before ca-certificates-2021.2.50-72 for Amazon Linux 2 (AL2) does not properly remove certain TrustCor root certificates from the root store. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2022-23491. |
| An issue was discovered in the ProofreadPage extension for MediaWiki through 1.39.3. It leaks information about a suppressed user via the API and config variables. |
| Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the WebRTC component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 156, Firefox ESR 153.3, Thunderbird 156, and Thunderbird 153.3. |
| Sandbox escape in the Profile Backup component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 156 and Thunderbird 156. |
| Spoofing issue in the DOM: Navigation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 156, Firefox ESR 153.3, Thunderbird 156, and Thunderbird 153.3. |
| Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix allows a revoked session to remain fully authenticated.
A resource configured with session_identifier :jti and require_token_presence_for_authentication? disabled stores its session value as <jti>:<subject>. The jti is there so that signing out can revoke that one session. Neither reader consults it: AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.authenticate_resource_from_session/4 and AshAuthentication.Phoenix.LiveSession.on_mount/4 both split the value with split_identifier/2, discard the jti and pass the bare subject to AshAuthentication.subject_to_user/3, which reloads the record. The token-presence branch of each function does check its token, calling AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.get_token/3 with the jti and the purpose user. Because the revocation record is never read, neither its revoked state nor its expiry constrains the session, so a session captured before sign-out keeps working.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.9.1 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14; ash_authentication_phoenix: from 2.10.0 before 2.17.4 and from 3.0.0-rc.0 before 3.0.0-rc.11. |
| Improper preservation of permissions in the Avast sandbox minifilter driver (aswSnx.sys) on Windows allows a local, low-privileged attacker executing inside the sandbox to escape file isolation and escalate to SYSTEM.
When the sandbox virtualizes a file it copies the original security descriptor, but the driver opened the virtualization target object with GENERIC_WRITE and FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only, omitting WRITE_DAC. Every attempt to apply the original DACL therefore failed, and the failure was discarded silently, leaving virtualized copies of sensitive files with permissive permissions. Because the IRP_MJ_CREATE callback additionally did not strip WRITE_DAC for sensitive directories, a sandboxed process could rewrite the security descriptor of a virtualized object, read the virtualized copy of the SAM database, extract local NTLM password hashes and execute code as SYSTEM.
The absence of an IRP_MJ_SET_SECURITY callback in the driver's operation registration table is a related defense-in-depth gap, but it is not the control that prevents this attack. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record.
AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. |
| Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker who obtains a victim's OAuth2 state value to replay the callback and sign that victim into an attacker-controlled account.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.Plug.callback/2 clears the stored session_params through a rebinding step inside its with chain, conn <- delete_session(conn, session_key). Elixir evaluates the else block in the scope enclosing the with, so every failure path (the provider returning ?error=access_denied, an invalid code, a token-exchange error, or a registration or sign-in failure) reaches store_authentication_result/2 holding the original connection and the session entry is never removed. The value the module's own comment describes as protection against a CSRF-related attack is therefore consumed only when authentication succeeds, and survives a cancelled or failed attempt until the next request phase or session expiry.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.6.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. |
| An attacker can cause `named` to abort by sending a crafted DNS-over-HTTPS request with a cryptographically invalid SIG(0) record, and then closing the transport connection prematurely.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1. |
| The password reset funcionality is vulnerable to unauthorized account modification due to improper validation of the user_id parameter. An attacker can manipulate this predictable numeric identifier to reset passwords for arbitrary users without proving account ownership. |
| ToolJet before v3.16.208 fails to validate that authenticated users belong to the organization specified in the organizationId path parameter of tooljet-db endpoints, allowing any Builder user to read, modify, and delete tables across tenant boundaries. Attackers can extract victim organization IDs from public app endpoints, then exploit schema operation endpoints to disclose table schemas, plant malicious tables, corrupt existing schemas, or permanently destroy victim data without any relationship to the target organization. |
| Improper resource exposure in Preload in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| UMTS FP protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.7 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| C12.22 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.7 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| Mitigation bypass in the Data Loss Prevention component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 154, Firefox ESR 140.14, Firefox ESR 153.1, Thunderbird 154, Thunderbird 140.14, and Thunderbird 153.1. |
| A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6, macOS Tahoe 26.7. An app may bypass Gatekeeper checks. |
| The Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 28.1 via the 'conversation_id' parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the full AI booking conversation transcript of any customer — leaking names, email addresses, phone numbers, and appointment details echoed by the assistant — and inject arbitrary messages into any victim conversation that are subsequently replayed to the Cloud AI worker along with the full private history. Because AI conversations are stored with no owner, user, or session identifier and conversation IDs are sequential integers, an unauthenticated attacker can enumerate all customer conversations simply by incrementing the conversation_id parameter. |
