| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Fix race condition and ordering in port unregistration
A synchronization issue exists during port unregistration where pending
partner work items can race against workqueue destruction, leading to
use-after-free conditions:
cros_ec_ucsi cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto: error -ETIMEDOUT: PPM init failed
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x83/0x4a0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__cfi_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
run_timer_softirq+0x3b6/0xbd0
sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0x110
irq_exit_rcu+0x18d/0x330
fred_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x80
Fix this by ensuring strict ordering and proper serialization during
teardown:
1. Move ucsi_unregister_partner() to the beginning of the teardown
sequence and protect it under the connector mutex lock.
2. Ensure all pending partner tasks are explicitly flushed and finished
before the workqueue is destroyed.
3. Switch from mod_delayed_work() to a cancel_delayed_work() and
queue_delayed_work() sequence. This guarantees that items currently marked
as pending won't be scheduled an additional time, preventing a double
release of resources which leads to the following crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto-con2 ucsi_poll_worker
RIP: 0010:ucsi_poll_worker+0x65/0x1e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
process_scheduled_works+0x218/0x6d0
worker_thread+0x188/0x3f0
__cfi_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x226/0x2a0
To ensure these rules are applied identically across both the normal
teardown and the ucsi_init() error paths, consolidate the cleanup logic
into a new helper, ucsi_unregister_port(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: serialize kernel accept preallocation with socket teardown
rxrpc_kernel_charge_accept() reads rx->backlog without any
socket/backlog synchronization and passes that raw pointer into
rxrpc_service_prealloc_one(). A concurrent rxrpc_discard_prealloc()
sets rx->backlog = NULL and frees the backlog rings, so a kernel
preallocation worker can keep using a freed struct rxrpc_backlog
while updating *_backlog_head/tail and array slots.
Serialize the state check and backlog lookup with the socket lock,
and reject kernel preallocation once teardown has disabled
listening or discarded the service backlog. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: restrict socket queue dumps in enqueue tracepoints
tipc_sk_enqueue() runs with sk->sk_lock.slock held while the socket is
owned by user context. The spinlock protects the backlog queue in this
path, but it does not serialize against the socket owner consuming or
purging sk_receive_queue.
KASAN reported:
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1050 Comm: tipc3 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6+ #126 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 lib/dump_stack.c:123
print_report+0xce/0x5b0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:597
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380
tipc_skb_dump+0x1327/0x16f0 net/tipc/trace.c:73
tipc_list_dump+0x208/0x2e0 net/tipc/trace.c:187
tipc_sk_dump+0xaf6/0xd60 net/tipc/socket.c:3996
trace_event_raw_event_tipc_sk_class+0x312/0x5a0 net/tipc/trace.h:188
tipc_sk_rcv+0xb1d/0x1d50 net/tipc/socket.c:2497
tipc_node_xmit+0x1c3/0x1440 net/tipc/node.c:1689
__tipc_sendmsg+0x97a/0x1440 net/tipc/socket.c:1512
tipc_sendmsg+0x52/0x80 net/tipc/socket.c:1400
sock_sendmsg+0x2f6/0x3e0 net/socket.c:825
splice_to_socket+0x7f9/0x1010 fs/splice.c:884
do_splice+0xe21/0x2330 fs/splice.c:936
__do_splice+0x153/0x260 fs/splice.c:1431
__x64_sys_splice+0x150/0x230 fs/splice.c:1616
x64_sys_call+0xeb5/0x2790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x620 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130
RIP: 0033:0x71624e8aafe2
Code: 08 0f 85 71 3a ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66
RSP: 002b:0000716157ffed68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000113
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000716157fff6c0 RCX: 000071624e8aafe2
RDX: 000000000000005f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000066
RBP: 0000716157ffed90 R08: 0000000000008000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffff00
R13: 0000000000000021 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff89799c40
</TASK>
The TIPC_DUMP_ALL tracepoints in tipc_sk_enqueue() also dump
sk_receive_queue and can therefore dereference skbs that the socket
owner has already dequeued or freed. Restrict these dumps to
TIPC_DUMP_SK_BKLGQ, which matches the queue protected by the held
spinlock.
Keep the change limited to the enqueue path, where the unsafe queue dump
is reachable while the socket is owned by user context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Use wait_woken() in wait_for_tmp_stat()
wait_event_interruptible_timeout() evaluates its condition after setting
the current task state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE.
With CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP this triggers a warning when the IRQ wait
path is used:
tpm_tis_status()
tpm_tis_spi_read_bytes()
tpm_tis_spi_transfer_full()
spi_bus_lock()
mutex_lock()
Address this with the following measures:
1. Call wait_tpm_stat_cond() only while tasking is running.
2. Use wait_woken() to wait for changes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: dw-edma: Add spinlock to protect DONE_INT_MASK and ABORT_INT_MASK
The DONE_INT_MASK and ABORT_INT_MASK registers are shared by all DMA
channels, and modifying them requires a read-modify-write sequence.
Because this operation is not atomic, concurrent calls to
dw_edma_v0_core_start() can introduce race conditions if two channels
update these registers simultaneously.
Add a spinlock to serialize access to these registers and prevent race
conditions.
[den: update dw_edma.lock comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it
Currently, copy_process() can bail out to free_task() before p->bpf_storage
has been initialized, with this call graph (shown here for the
!CONFIG_MEMCG case):
copy_process
dup_task_struct
arch_dup_task_struct
[copies the entire task_struct, including ->bpf_storage member]
[RLIMIT_NPROC check fails]
delayed_free_task
free_task
bpf_task_storage_free
rcu_dereference(task->bpf_storage)
bpf_local_storage_destroy
In this case, the nascent task's ->bpf_storage member that
bpf_local_storage_destroy() operates on is a plain copy of the parent's
->bpf_storage pointer, not a real initialized pointer.
This leads to badness (kernel hangs, UAF).
This is reachable as long as the process calling fork() has been inserted
into a task storage map. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libertas_tf: fix use-after-free in lbtf_free_adapter()
lbtf_free_adapter() calls timer_delete(&priv->command_timer), which does
not wait for a running command_timer_fn() callback. lbtf_free_adapter()
runs on the teardown path right before ieee80211_free_hw() frees priv,
both in lbtf_remove_card() and in the probe error path. command_timer is
armed by mod_timer() in lbtf_cmd() whenever a firmware command is sent.
command_timer_fn() dereferences priv. If a command times out as the
device is removed, command_timer_fn() runs concurrently with teardown and
dereferences priv after it has been freed.
This is the same use-after-free that commit 03cc8f90d053 ("wifi: libertas:
fix use-after-free in lbs_free_adapter()") fixed in the sibling libertas
driver. The libertas_tf variant has the identical pattern and was left
unchanged. Use timer_delete_sync() so any in-flight callback completes
before priv is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
locking/rt: Fix the incorrect RCU protection in rt_spin_unlock()
rt_spin_unlock() releases the RCU protection before unlocking the
lock. That opens the door for the following UAF scenario:
T1 T2
spin_lock(&p->lock); rcu_read_lock();
invalidate(p); p = rcu_dereference(ptr);
rcu_assign_pointer(ptr, NULL); if (!p) return;
spin_unlock(&p->lock); spin_lock(&p->lock)
lock(&lock->lock);
rcu_read_lock();
kfree_rcu(p); rcu_read_unlock();
....
spin_unlock(&p->lock)
rcu_read_unlock(); // Ends grace period
rcu_do_batch()
kfree(p);
UAF -> rt_mutex_cmpxchg_release(&lock->lock...)
Regular spinlocks keep preemption disabled accross the unlock operation,
which provides full RCU protection, but the RT substitution fails to
resemble that. Same applies for the rwlock substitution.
Move the rcu_read_unlock() invocation past the unlock operations to match
the non-RT semantics. This makes it asymmetric vs. rt_xxx_lock(), but
that's harmless as the caller needs to hold RCU read lock across the lock
operation. The migrate_enable() call stays before the unlock operation
because there is no per CPU operation in the unlock path which would
require migration to be kept disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Call synchronize_rcu() when unregistering
This ensures that any RCU readers traversing the instance list
have finished, before releasing the reference on the tracer that
the instance points to. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor
queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close()
clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and
snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer.
A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT
that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked
runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while
timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri.
snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop()
is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the
instance still live. The queue is freed next.
The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the
freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick
derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt().
Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and
no queue ownership required.
Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no
longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have
drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing
q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt()
to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()),
so q->timer must stay valid until it drains. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix use-after-free in aggr_reset_state()
The aggr_reset_state() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous)
for the aggregation timer before proceeding to delete TID state and
before the structure is freed by callers like aggr_module_destroy().
If the timer callback (aggr_timeout) is executing when aggr_reset_state()
is called, the callback will continue to access aggr_conn fields like
rx_tid[] and stat[] which may be freed immediately after by
kfree(aggr_info->aggr_conn) in aggr_module_destroy().
Additionally, the timer callback can re-arm itself via mod_timer() while
aggr_reset_state() is running, creating a more complex race condition.
Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback
has completed before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: avoid auth_enable sysctl UAF during netns teardown
proc_sctp_do_auth() updates the SCTP control socket after changing
net.sctp.auth_enable. The handler gets the per-net SCTP state from
ctl->data, so an already opened sysctl file can still target a network
namespace while that namespace is being torn down.
SCTP previously registered its per-net sysctls from sctp_defaults_init(),
while the control socket is created later from sctp_ctrlsock_init(). This
exposed a window during initialization where auth_enable was writable
before net->sctp.ctl_sock existed, and a teardown window where auth_enable
stayed writable after inet_ctl_sock_destroy() had released the control
socket.
Move the per-net SCTP sysctl registration into sctp_ctrlsock_init() after
sctp_ctl_sock_init() succeeds, and unregister the sysctl table before
destroying the control socket in sctp_ctrlsock_exit(). If sysctl
registration fails after the control socket was created, destroy the
control socket in the same init path.
Make sctp_sysctl_net_unregister() tolerate a missing header and clear the
saved pointer so init-error and exit paths can safely share the unregister
helper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Add global mutex to serialize trace_parser access
In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when
a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release
handlers to parse user input.
The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
- Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
- Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
- Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()
If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple
threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state,
specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted
input or undefined behavior.
Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access
to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent
corruption of parser state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: mrp: fix uninitialised bytes on the wire
br_mrp_alloc_test_skb() builds MRP test frames on an skb from
dev_alloc_skb(), which does not clear the linear data area. On the MRA
ring-role branch the sub-option TLV header is appended with
sub_tlv = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*sub_tlv));
sub_tlv->type = BR_MRP_SUB_TLV_HEADER_TEST_AUTO_MGR;
so sub_tlv->length is never written, and the two trailing alignment bytes
are appended with a bare skb_put() that does not clear them either. The
neighbouring oui and sub_opt regions are explicitly zeroed, so three
uninitialised bytes are left in every MRA MRP_Test frame that goes out.
Put the sub-option TLV header and the alignment padding in a single
skb_put_zero(), which clears both. The AUTO_MGR sub-TLV carries no
payload, so the zeroed length field is already the value it should have. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: us144mkii: re-anchor capture URBs on resubmission
capture_urb_complete() resubmits each capture URB without anchoring it:
usb_get_urb(urb);
ret = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
Anchoring is a property of a submission, not of the URB. The giveback
path calls usb_unanchor_urb() before urb->complete(), so an URB
resubmitted from its own completion handler is off the anchor. The
capture URBs are anchored once, at stream start, so from the first
completion onward tascam->capture_anchor is empty.
tascam_free_urbs(), tascam_disconnect(), tascam_suspend() and the
stop-work path all call usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&tascam->capture_anchor)
to reap the capture URBs before anything is freed. With the anchor empty
those calls return immediately and the URBs stay queued on the host
controller.
tascam_free_urbs() then returns the capture transfer buffers with
usb_free_coherent(), and snd_card_free() releases the snd_card
allocation that embeds tascam (card->private_data). The controller
completes the queued URBs afterwards, writing device-supplied data into
the freed transfer buffer, and capture_urb_complete() dereferences the
freed driver object.
KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dummy_timer
Write of size 512 at addr ffff000015b62000
__asan_memcpy
dummy_timer
hrtimer_run_softirq
Allocated by task 64:
usb_alloc_coherent
tascam_alloc_urbs
tascam_probe
Freed by task 170:
usb_free_coherent
tascam_free_urbs
tascam_disconnect
usb_unbind_interface
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in capture_urb_complete
Read of size 4 at addr ffff0000170ee878
Freed by task 170:
release_card_device
snd_card_free
tascam_disconnect
Restore the usb_anchor_urb() between the reference count bump and the
resubmission. That also makes the handler's usb_unanchor_urb() failure
arm meaningful again and restores usb_kill_anchored_urbs() as a barrier
on the disconnect, suspend and stop-work paths.
The anchoring was removed on the premise that the URB is already anchored
from the initial submission, which does not hold once the first giveback
has run.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: defer md5sig_info kfree past RCU grace period in tcp_connect
The md5+ao reconciliation in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c)
has two symmetric branches:
if (needs_md5) {
tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false);
} else if (needs_ao) {
tcp_clear_md5_list(sk);
kfree(rcu_replace_pointer(tp->md5sig_info, NULL, ...));
}
Both branches free a per-socket auth-info object while the socket is
in TCP_SYN_SENT and is already on the inet ehash (inserted by
inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect()). Both branches are reachable
by softirq RX-path readers that load the corresponding info pointer
via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken.
The needs_md5 branch is fixed in the prior patch by re-introducing
the call_rcu() free in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(): the equivalent per-key
loop runs inside tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(), the RCU callback, so by the
time it frees each tcp_ao_key all softirq readers that captured the
container have already completed rcu_read_unlock().
The needs_ao branch is not symmetric in the same way. The container
free can be deferred via kfree_rcu(md5sig, rcu) -- struct
tcp_md5sig_info already has the required rcu member
(include/net/tcp.h:1999-2002), and the rest of the tree already does
this in the tcp_md5sig_info_add() rollback paths
(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1410, 1436). But the per-key teardown is done
by tcp_clear_md5_list() in process context BEFORE the container's
RCU grace period: it walks &md5sig->head and frees each
tcp_md5sig_key with bare hlist_del + kfree. A concurrent softirq
reader in __tcp_md5_do_lookup() / __tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact()
(tcp_ipv4.c:1253, 1298) walks the same list via
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() and races with that bare kfree on the
keys themselves -- a per-key slab use-after-free of the same class
as the TCP-AO bug, on the same race window.
Fix this in two halves:
1. Convert the bare kfree() in tcp_connect() to kfree_rcu() so the
md5sig_info container joins the rest of the md5sig lifecycle.
The local-variable lift is mechanical and required because
kfree_rcu() is a macro that expects an lvalue.
2. Make tcp_clear_md5_list() RCU-safe by replacing hlist_del +
kfree(key) with hlist_del_rcu + kfree_rcu(key, rcu). struct
tcp_md5sig_key already carries the rcu member
(include/net/tcp.h:1995) and tcp_md5_do_del()
(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1456) already uses kfree_rcu, so this
restores the lifecycle invariant the rest of the file follows
rather than introducing a one-off.
The other caller of tcp_clear_md5_list() is tcp_md5_destruct_sock()
(net/ipv4/tcp.c:412), which runs from the sock destructor when the
socket is already unhashed and unreachable; the extra grace period
there is unnecessary but harmless. Making the helper unconditionally
RCU-safe is the cleaner contract.
The needs_ao branch is not reachable by the userns reproducer used
to demonstrate the AO-side splat (the repro installs both keys but
ends up in the needs_md5 branch because the connect peer matches
the MD5 key, not the AO key); however the symmetric race exists
and a maintainer touching this code should not have to think about
which branch escapes RCU and which one does not.
[also credits to Qihang, who found that this races with tcp-diag] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: sh: rz-dmac: Move interrupt request after everything is set up
Once the interrupt is requested, the interrupt handler may run immediately.
Since the IRQ handler can access channel->ch_base, which is initialized
only after requesting the IRQ, this may lead to invalid memory access.
Likewise, the IRQ thread may access uninitialized data (the ld_free,
ld_queue, and ld_active lists), which may also lead to issues.
Request the interrupts only after everything is set up. To keep the error
path simpler, use dmam_alloc_coherent() instead of dma_alloc_coherent(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: fix uninitialized xprt_create_args structure
The xprt_create_args structure is allocated on the stack without
initialization in rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_add_xprt_store(). While some
fields are manually populated, critical fields like srcaddr, bc_xps,
and flags contain uninitialized stack garbage.
This can lead to:
1. Kernel panic when xs_setup_xprt() dereferences garbage srcaddr
2. Information leak if srcaddr points to sensitive stack data
3. Unpredictable behavior if flags has random bits set
The fix is to zero-initialize the structure to ensure all unused
fields are NULL/0, preventing the transport setup code from acting
on garbage data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openrisc: Fix jump_label smp syncing
The original commit 8c30b0018f9d ("openrisc: Add jump label support")
copies from arm64 and does not properly consider how icache invalidation
on remote cores works in OpenRISC. On OpenRISC remote icaches need to
be invalidated otherwise static key's may remain state after updating.
Fix SMP cache syncing by:
1. Properly invalidate remote core icaches on SMP systems by using
icache_all_inv. The old code uses kick_all_cpus_sync() which runs a
no-op IPI function call on remote CPU's which does execute a lot of
code and flushes many cache lines in the process, but does not flush
all and it's not correct on OpenRISC.
2. For architectures that do not have WRITETHROUGH caches be sure
to flush the dcache after patching.
To test this I first reproduced the issue using a custom test module
[0]. The test confirmed that some icache lines maintained stale
static_key code sequences after calling static_branch_enable(). After
this patch there are no longer jump_label coherency issues.
[0] https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-utils/tree/master/tests/smp_static_key_test |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: put stats for scheme_add_dirs() internal error
damon_sysfs_scheme_add_dirs() setup the tried_regions directory after the
stats directory setup is completed. When the tried_regions directory
setup is failed, the setup function ensures the reference for the tried
regions directory is released. Hence the error path should put references
on setup succeeded directory objects, starting from the stats directory.
However, the error path is putting the tried_regions directory instead of
the stats directory.
As a direct result, the stats directory object is leaked. Worse yet, if
the tried_regions directory setup failed from the initial allocation, the
scheme->tried_regions field remains uninitialized. The following
kobject_put(&scheme->tried_regions->kobj) call in the error path will
dereference the uninitialized memory. The setup failures should not be
common. But once it happens, the consequence is quite bad.
Fix this issue by correctly putting the stats directory instead of the
tried_regions directory.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
