| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
Two concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can
trigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock
when racing with a concurrent unmap:
thread#0 thread#1
-------- --------
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)
-> poisons the folio successfully
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) unmap(folio)
try_memory_failure_hugetlb
get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock) <- held
__get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
hugetlb_update_hwpoison()
-> MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED
goto out:
folio_put()
refcount: 1 -> 0
free_huge_folio()
spin_lock_irqsave(&hugetlb_lock)
-> AA DEADLOCK!
The out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop
the GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c
wrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released
the page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to
zero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the
non-recursive hugetlb_lock.
Fix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper
into get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the
folio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the
lock.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix race, rename label per Miaohe] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR
signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command
without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer
within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is
larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before
pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling
packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target
transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms.
Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can
force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling
packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands.
Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and
reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP
carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched.
The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject
identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and
that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded.
Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently
discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never
learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request
command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing
bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process.
We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the
first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read.
The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both
trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is
available for a Fixes tag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tee: shm: fix shm leak in register_shm_helper()
register_shm_helper() allocates shm before calling
iov_iter_npages(). If iov_iter_npages() returns 0, the function
jumps to err_ctx_put and leaks shm.
This can be triggered by TEE_IOC_SHM_REGISTER with
struct tee_ioctl_shm_register_data where length is 0.
Jump to err_free_shm instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: fix krealloc() memory leak
Don't just overwrite the original pointer passed to krealloc()
with its return value without checking latter:
MEM = krealloc(MEM, SZ, GFP);
If krealloc() returns NULL, that erases the pointer
to the still allocated memory, hence leaks this memory.
Instead, use a temporary variable, check it's not NULL
and only then assign it to the original pointer:
TMP = krealloc(MEM, SZ, GFP);
if (!TMP) return;
MEM = TMP;
While on it, use krealloc_array(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix a potential NPD in cleanup_prefix_route()
addrconf_get_prefix_route() can return the fib6_null_entry sentinel
entry which has a NULL fib6_table pointer. Therefore, before setting the
route's expiration time, check that we are not working with this entry,
as otherwise a NPD will be triggered [1].
Note that the other callers of addrconf_get_prefix_route() are not
susceptible to this bug:
1. addrconf_prefix_rcv(): Requests a route with the 'RTF_ADDRCONF |
RTF_PREFIX_RT' flags which are not set on fib6_null_entry.
2. modify_prefix_route(): Fixed by commit a747e02430df ("ipv6: avoid
possible NULL deref in modify_prefix_route()").
3. __ipv6_ifa_notify(): Calls ip6_del_rt() which specifically checks for
fib6_null_entry and returns an error.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__kasan_check_byte (mm/kasan/common.c:573)
lock_acquire.part.0 (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5842 (discriminator 1))
_raw_spin_lock_bh (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:182 (discriminator 1))
cleanup_prefix_route (net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1280)
ipv6_del_addr (net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1342)
inet6_addr_del.isra.0 (net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3119)
inet6_rtm_deladdr (net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4812)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6997)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2555)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1899)
__sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:802 (discriminator 4))
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2698)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2752)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2784)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: ocp: fix resource freeing order
Commit a60fc3294a37 ("ptp: rework ptp_clock_unregister() to disable
events") added a call to ptp_disable_all_events() which changes the
configuration of pins if they support EXTTS events. In ptp_ocp_detach()
pins resources are freed before ptp_clock_unregister() and it leads to
use-after-free during driver removal. Fix it by changing the order of
free/unregister calls. To avoid irq handler running on the other core
while ptp device unregistering, call synchronize_irq() after HW is
configured to stop producing irqs and no irqs are in-flight. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: rockchip: fix generic IRQ chip leak on remove
The driver allocates domain generic chips using
irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe. However, on driver
remove/teardown, the generic chips are not automatically freed when the
IRQ domain is removed because the domain flags do not include
IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC.
This causes both the domain generic chips structure and the associated
generic chips to be leaked. Additionally, the generic chips remain on
the global gc_list and may later be visited by generic IRQ chip suspend,
resume, or shutdown callbacks after the GPIO bank has been removed,
potentially resulting in a use-after-free and kernel crash.
Fix the resource leak by explicitly calling
irq_domain_remove_generic_chips() before removing the IRQ domain in
rockchip_gpio_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register
For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.
The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.
Fix both:
- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
used on the other early-return path), and
- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
the eval writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs
[Why & How]
dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc
without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to
any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a
kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node.
The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always
passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when
size < 36.
Fix both issues by:
- Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL
- Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data))
(cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size
[Why & How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.
Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().
(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.
Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.
(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops
[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.
Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Fix vaddr leak when indirect CSD has zeroed workgroups
v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indirect() maps both the indirect
buffer and the workgroup buffer and is expected to release them before
returning. When any of the workgroup counts read from the buffer is zero,
the function bailed out early and skipped the cleanup, leaking the vaddr
mappings of both BOs.
Jump to the cleanup path instead of returning directly, so the mappings
are always dropped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display
The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().
In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.
Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.
Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.
Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.
Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").
(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()
When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero,
get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the
return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and
suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately
dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.
Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying
num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.
A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op
(q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards
all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers
already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.
(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast
tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to
protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation
is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal
XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is
shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of-
bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation.
Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate
it against the expected struct size before each cast. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference
PCIe errors detected by a Root Port or Downstream Port cause error
recovery services to run on all subordinate devices regardless of
administrative state.
The .error_detected() callback, bnxt_io_error_detected(), disables
and synchronizes IRQs via bnxt_disable_int_sync(), which calls
bnxt_cp_num_to_irq_num() to map completion rings to IRQs using
bp->bnapi.
Since bp->bnapi is allocated on NIC open and freed on NIC close, PCIe
error recovery on a closed NIC can dereference a NULL pointer.
Check if bp->bnapi is NULL before disabling and synchronizing IRQs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix buffer over-read in rtw_update_protection
rtw_update_protection() is called with a pointer offset into the
ies buffer but the full ie_length is passed, causing a potential
buffer over-read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx()
Fix the race by pruning the bin while still holding xfrm_policy_lock,
before dropping it. Use __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin() directly since
the lock is already held. The wrapper xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin()
becomes unused and is removed.
Race:
CPU0 (XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) CPU1 (XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
========================== ==========================
xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup()
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol)
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret)
// wide window, lock not held
xfrm_hash_rebuild():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush():
kfree_rcu(bin) // bin freed
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin)
// UAF: bin is freed |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: dummy: fix UMP event stack overread
The dummy sequencer port forwards events by copying an incoming
struct snd_seq_event into a stack temporary, rewriting source and
destination, and dispatching the temporary to subscribers. That legacy
event storage is smaller than struct snd_seq_ump_event.
When a UMP event reaches the dummy client, the copy leaves the UMP flag
set but only provides legacy-sized stack storage. The subscriber
delivery path then uses snd_seq_event_packet_size() and copies a
UMP-sized packet from that stack object, reading past the end of the
temporary.
Use the existing union __snd_seq_event storage and copy the packet size
reported for the incoming event before rewriting the common routing
fields. This preserves the full UMP packet for UMP events while keeping
legacy event handling unchanged. |
