| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.21 improperly parse the left-most X-Forwarded-For header value when requests originate from configured trusted proxies, allowing attackers to spoof client IP addresses. In proxy chains that append or preserve header values, attackers can inject malicious header content to influence security decisions including authentication rate-limiting and IP-based access controls. |
| Versions of the package jsrsasign before 11.1.1 are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature via the DSA domain-parameter validation in KJUR.crypto.DSA.setPublic (and the related DSA/X509 verification flow in src/dsa-2.0.js). An attacker can forge DSA signatures or X.509 certificates that X509.verifySignature() accepts by supplying malicious domain parameters such as g=1, y=1, and a fixed r=1, which make the verification equation true for any hash. |
| OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to version 10.0.34, the WhatsApp POST webhook handler (/notification/whatsapp/webhook) processes incoming status update events without verifying the Meta/WhatsApp X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC signature, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to send forged webhook payloads that manipulate notification delivery status records, suppress alerts, and corrupt audit trails. The codebase already implements proper signature verification for Slack webhooks. This issue has been patched in version 10.0.34. |
| OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.3.11, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.3.11. |
| A flaw was found in the decompression function of registry-support. This issue can be triggered if an unauthenticated remote attacker tricks a user into parsing a devfile which uses the `parent` or `plugin` keywords. This could download a malicious archive and cause the cleanup process to overwrite or delete files outside of the archive, which should not be allowed. |
| In Juju from version 3.0.0 through 3.6.18, when a secret owner grants permissions to a secret to a grantee, the secret owner relies exclusively on a predictable XID of the secret to verify ownership. This allows a malicious grantee which can request secrets to predict past secrets granted by the same secret owner to different grantees, allowing them to use the resources granted by those past secrets. Successful exploitation relies on a very specific configuration, specific data semantic, and the administrator having the need to deploy at least two different applications, one of them controlled by the attacker. |
| Jenkins 2.442 through 2.554 (both inclusive), LTS 2.426.3 through LTS 2.541.2 (both inclusive) performs origin validation of requests made through the CLI WebSocket endpoint by computing the expected origin for comparison using the Host or X-Forwarded-Host HTTP request headers, making it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks that allow bypassing origin validation. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to version 4.5.2, in Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global `[passwords] default` credential. An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue. |
| Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, in `next dev`, cross-site protection for internal websocket endpoints could treat `Origin: null` as a bypass case even if `allowedDevOrigins` is configured, allowing privacy-sensitive/opaque contexts (for example sandboxed documents) to connect unexpectedly. If a dev server is reachable from attacker-controlled content, an attacker may be able to connect to the HMR websocket channel and interact with dev websocket traffic. This affects development mode only. Apps without a configured `allowedDevOrigins` still allow connections from any origin. The issue is fixed in version 16.1.7 by validating `Origin: null` through the same cross-site origin-allowance checks used for other origins. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose `next dev` to untrusted networks and/or block websocket upgrades to `/_next/webpack-hmr` when `Origin` is `null` at the proxy. |
| Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, `origin: null` was treated as a "missing" origin during Server Action CSRF validation. As a result, requests from opaque contexts (such as sandboxed iframes) could bypass origin verification instead of being validated as cross-origin requests. An attacker could induce a victim browser to submit Server Actions from a sandboxed context, potentially executing state-changing actions with victim credentials (CSRF). This is fixed in version 16.1.7 by treating `'null'` as an explicit origin value and enforcing host/origin checks unless `'null'` is explicitly allowlisted in `experimental.serverActions.allowedOrigins`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, add CSRF tokens for sensitive Server Actions, prefer `SameSite=Strict` on sensitive auth cookies, and/or do not allow `'null'` in `serverActions.allowedOrigins` unless intentionally required and additionally protected. |
| Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX) is an open standard for machine learning interoperability. In versions up to and including 1.20.1, a security control bypass exists in onnx.hub.load() due to improper logic in the repository trust verification mechanism. While the function is designed to warn users when loading models from non-official sources, the use of the silent=True parameter completely suppresses all security warnings and confirmation prompts. This vulnerability transforms a standard model-loading function into a vector for Zero-Interaction Supply-Chain Attacks. When chained with file-system vulnerabilities, an attacker can silently exfiltrate sensitive files (SSH keys, cloud credentials) from the victim's machine the moment the model is loaded. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available. |
| Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.9, a JWK Header Injection vulnerability in authlib's JWS implementation allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge arbitrary JWT tokens that pass signature verification. When key=None is passed to any JWS deserialization function, the library extracts and uses the cryptographic key embedded in the attacker-controlled JWT jwk header field. An attacker can sign a token with their own private key, embed the matching public key in the header, and have the server accept the forged token as cryptographically valid — bypassing authentication and authorization entirely. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.9. |
| A condition in ScreenConnect may allow an actor with access to server-level cryptographic material used for authentication to obtain unauthorized access, including elevated privileges, in certain scenarios. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Font Settings prior to SMR Mar-2026 Release 1 allows physical attackers to use custom font. |
| wpDiscuz before 7.6.47 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability in the getIP() function that allows attackers to bypass IP-based rate limiting and ban enforcement by trusting untrusted HTTP headers. Attackers can set HTTP_CLIENT_IP or HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR headers to spoof their IP address and circumvent security controls. |
| Unity Catalog is an open, multi-modal Catalog for data and AI. In 0.4.0 and earlier, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider. |
| ZeptoClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 0.7.6, the generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.6. |
| Dark Reader is an accessibility browser extension that makes web pages colors dark. The dynamic dark mode feature of the extension works by analyzing the colors of web pages found in CSS style sheet files. In order to analyze cross-origin style sheets (stored on websites different from the original web page), Dark Reader requests such files via a background worker, ensuring the request is performed with no credentials and that the content type of the response is a CSS file. Prior to Dark Reader 4.9.117, this style content was assigned to an HTML Style Element in order to parse and loop through style declarations, and also stored in page's Session Storage for performance gains. This could allow a website author to request a style sheet from a locally running web server, for example by having a link pointing to `http[:]//localhost[:]8080/style[.]css`. The brute force of the host name, port and file name would be unlikely due to performance impact, that would cause the browser tab to hang shortly, but it could be possible to request a style sheet if the full URL was known in advance. As per December 18, 2025 there is no known exploit of the issue. The problem has been fixed in version 4.9.117 on December 3, 2025. The style sheets are now parsed using modern Constructed Style Sheets API and the contents of cross-origin style sheets is no longer stored in page's Session Storage. Version 4.9.118 (December 8, 2025) restricts cross-origin requests to localhost aliases, IP addresses, hosts with ports and non-HTTPS resources. The absolute majority of users have received an update 4.1.117 or 4.9.118 automatically within a week. However users must ensure their automatic updates are not blocked and they are using the latest version of the extension by going to chrome://extensions or about:addons pages in browser settings. Users utilizing manual builds must upgrade to version 4.9.118 and above. Developers using `darkreader` NPM package for their own websites are likely not affected, but must ensure the function passed to `setFetchMethod()` for performing cross-origin requests works within the intended scope. Developers using custom forks of earlier versions of Dark Reader to build other extensions or integrating into their apps or browsers must ensure they perform cross-origin requests safely and the responses are not accessible outside of the app or extension. |
| A flaw was found in Booth, a cluster ticket manager. If a specially-crafted hash is passed to gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(), it may allow an invalid HMAC to be accepted by the Booth server. |
