| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc/tegra: pmc: Fix unsafe generic_handle_irq() call
Currently, when resuming from system suspend on Tegra platforms,
the following warning is observed:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14459 at kernel/irq/irqdesc.c:666
Call trace:
handle_irq_desc+0x20/0x58 (P)
tegra186_pmc_wake_syscore_resume+0xe4/0x15c
syscore_resume+0x3c/0xb8
suspend_devices_and_enter+0x510/0x540
pm_suspend+0x16c/0x1d8
The warning occurs because generic_handle_irq() is being called from
a non-interrupt context which is considered as unsafe.
Fix this warning by deferring generic_handle_irq() call to an IRQ work
which gets executed in hard IRQ context where generic_handle_irq()
can be called safely.
When PREEMPT_RT kernels are used, regular IRQ work (initialized with
init_irq_work) is deferred to run in per-CPU kthreads in preemptible
context rather than hard IRQ context. Hence, use the IRQ_WORK_INIT_HARD
variant so that with PREEMPT_RT kernels, the IRQ work is processed in
hardirq context instead of being deferred to a thread which is required
for calling generic_handle_irq().
On non-PREEMPT_RT kernels, both init_irq_work() and IRQ_WORK_INIT_HARD()
execute in IRQ context, so this change has no functional impact for
standard kernel configurations.
[treding@nvidia.com: miscellaneous cleanups] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: clear page->private in free_pages_prepare()
Several subsystems (slub, shmem, ttm, etc.) use page->private but don't
clear it before freeing pages. When these pages are later allocated as
high-order pages and split via split_page(), tail pages retain stale
page->private values.
This causes a use-after-free in the swap subsystem. The swap code uses
page->private to track swap count continuations, assuming freshly
allocated pages have page->private == 0. When stale values are present,
swap_count_continued() incorrectly assumes the continuation list is valid
and iterates over uninitialized page->lru containing LIST_POISON values,
causing a crash:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000100-0xdead000000000107]
RIP: 0010:__do_sys_swapoff+0x1151/0x1860
Fix this by clearing page->private in free_pages_prepare(), ensuring all
freed pages have clean state regardless of previous use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer
When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as "mem=<size>", the physical range that contains the carried
over IMA measurement list may fall outside the truncated RAM leading to a
kernel panic.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
#PF: error_code(0x0000) – not-present page
Other architectures already validate the range with page_is_ram(), as done
in commit cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds") do a similar check on x86.
Without carrying the measurement list across kexec, the attestation
would fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cpsw_new: Fix potential unregister of netdev that has not been registered yet
If an error occurs during register_netdev() for the first MAC in
cpsw_register_ports(), even though cpsw->slaves[0].ndev is set to NULL,
cpsw->slaves[1].ndev would remain unchanged. This could later cause
cpsw_unregister_ports() to attempt unregistering the second MAC.
To address this, add a check for ndev->reg_state before calling
unregister_netdev(). With this change, setting cpsw->slaves[i].ndev
to NULL becomes unnecessary and can be removed accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: verify the previous kernel's IMA buffer lies in addressable RAM
Patch series "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()", v3.
When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as "mem=<size>" we observe a pafe fault that happens.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
#PF: error_code(0x0000) not-present page
This happens on x86_64 only, as this is already fixed in aarch64 in
commit: cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds")
This patch (of 3):
When the second-stage kernel is booted with a limiting command line (e.g.
"mem=<size>"), the IMA measurement buffer handed over from the previous
kernel may fall outside the addressable RAM of the new kernel. Accessing
such a buffer can fault during early restore.
Introduce a small generic helper, ima_validate_range(), which verifies
that a physical [start, end] range for the previous-kernel IMA buffer lies
within addressable memory:
- On x86, use pfn_range_is_mapped().
- On OF based architectures, use page_is_ram(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: ensure safe access to master conntrack
Holding reference on the expectation is not sufficient, the master
conntrack object can just go away, making exp->master invalid.
To access exp->master safely:
- Grab the nf_conntrack_expect_lock, this gets serialized with
clean_from_lists() which also holds this lock when the master
conntrack goes away.
- Hold reference on master conntrack via nf_conntrack_find_get().
Not so easy since the master tuple to look up for the master conntrack
is not available in the existing problematic paths.
This patch goes for extending the nf_conntrack_expect_lock section
to address this issue for simplicity, in the cases that are described
below this is just slightly extending the lock section.
The add expectation command already holds a reference to the master
conntrack from ctnetlink_create_expect().
However, the delete expectation command needs to grab the spinlock
before looking up for the expectation. Expand the existing spinlock
section to address this to cover the expectation lookup. Note that,
the nf_ct_expect_iterate_net() calls already grabs the spinlock while
iterating over the expectation table, which is correct.
The get expectation command needs to grab the spinlock to ensure master
conntrack does not go away. This also expands the existing spinlock
section to cover the expectation lookup too. I needed to move the
netlink skb allocation out of the spinlock to keep it GFP_KERNEL.
For the expectation events, the IPEXP_DESTROY event is already delivered
under the spinlock, just move the delivery of IPEXP_NEW under the
spinlock too because the master conntrack event cache is reached through
exp->master.
While at it, add lockdep notations to help identify what codepaths need
to grab the spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
PF_KEY export paths use `pfkey_sockaddr_size()` when reserving sockaddr
payload space, so IPv6 addresses occupy 32 bytes on the wire. However,
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()` initializes only the first 28 bytes of
`struct sockaddr_in6`, leaving the final 4 aligned bytes uninitialized.
Not every PF_KEY message is affected. The state and policy dump builders
already zero the whole message buffer before filling the sockaddr
payloads. Keep the fix to the export paths that still append aligned
sockaddr payloads with plain `skb_put()`:
- `SADB_ACQUIRE`
- `SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING`
- `SADB_X_MIGRATE`
Fix those paths by clearing only the aligned sockaddr tail after
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Fix not releasing workqueue on .release()
The workqueue associated with an DSA/IAA device is not released when
the object is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: check tdls flag in ieee80211_tdls_oper
When NL80211_TDLS_ENABLE_LINK is called, the code only checks if the
station exists but not whether it is actually a TDLS station. This
allows the operation to proceed for non-TDLS stations, causing
unintended side effects like modifying channel context and HT
protection before failing.
Add a check for sta->sta.tdls early in the ENABLE_LINK case, before
any side effects occur, to ensure the operation is only allowed for
actual TDLS peers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in set_cig_params_sync
hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in
set_cig_params_sync, otherwise it's possible it is freed concurrently.
Take hdev lock to prevent hci_conn from being deleted or modified
concurrently. Just RCU lock is not suitable here, as we also want to
avoid "tearing" in the configuration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: u_ether: Fix NULL pointer deref in eth_get_drvinfo
Commit ec35c1969650 ("usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix net_device lifecycle with
device_move") reparents the gadget device to /sys/devices/virtual during
unbind, clearing the gadget pointer. If the userspace tool queries on
the surviving interface during this detached window, this leads to a
NULL pointer dereference.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
Call trace:
eth_get_drvinfo+0x50/0x90
ethtool_get_drvinfo+0x5c/0x1f0
__dev_ethtool+0xaec/0x1fe0
dev_ethtool+0x134/0x2e0
dev_ioctl+0x338/0x560
Add a NULL check for dev->gadget in eth_get_drvinfo(). When detached,
skip copying the fw_version and bus_info strings, which is natively
handled by ethtool_get_drvinfo for empty strings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi->nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io()
The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL
pointer dereference.
The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows:
F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback umount
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
- blk_mq_end_request
- bio_endio
- f2fs_write_end_io
: dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
: wake_up(&sbi->cp_wait)
- kill_f2fs_super
- kill_block_super
- f2fs_put_super
: iput(sbi->node_inode)
: sbi->node_inode = NULL
: f2fs_in_warm_node_list
- is_node_folio // sbi->node_inode is NULL and panic
The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi->node_inode) and
sets sbi->node_inode to NULL after sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is
decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may
dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to
the node inode, leading to a panic.
This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before
decrementing sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the
use-after-free condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an
under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared
`ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;
The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds;
it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable.
An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare
ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at
offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header +
4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also
reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448);
smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL
on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel
walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the
OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the
attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are
possible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure
Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure
path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same
function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any
TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML
(ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures
were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent
connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.
ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when
alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM
returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure
permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once
cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the
threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is
rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the
memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open
connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN
(0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded
host produce the same drift more slowly.
Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the
alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on
server_conf.max_connections.
Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport()
NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection
attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the
forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the
maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same
connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles
cleanly between zero and one on every accept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
writeback: Fix use after free in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn()
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like:
wb_get(new_wb);
while (1) {
list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs);
/* Nothing to do? */
if (!list)
break;
... process the items ...
}
Now adding of items to the list looks like:
wb_queue_isw()
if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs))
queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work);
Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it
can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is
empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw
items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing
use-after-free issues.
We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that
could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to
wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with
more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid
that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical
benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead.
That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have
added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to
remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
After async crypto completes, xfrm_input_resume() calls dev_put()
immediately on re-entry before the skb reaches transport_finish.
The skb->dev pointer is then used inside NF_HOOK and its okfn,
which can race with device teardown.
Remove the dev_put from the async resumption entry and instead
drop the reference after the NF_HOOK call in transport_finish,
using a saved device pointer since NF_HOOK may consume the skb.
This covers NF_DROP, NF_QUEUE and NF_STOLEN paths that skip
the okfn.
For non-transport exits (decaps, gro, drop) and secondary
async return points, release the reference inline when
async is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: meson-spicc: Fix double-put in remove path
meson_spicc_probe() registers the controller with
devm_spi_register_controller(), so teardown already drops the
controller reference via devm cleanup.
Calling spi_controller_put() again in meson_spicc_remove()
causes a double-put. |
