| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: mdb: Fix use-after-free in vxlan_mdb_flush()
vxlan_mdb_flush() iterates over the MDB entries using
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(), which only tolerates the removal of the
current entry. Contrary to the comment above the loop, the removal of an
entry can trigger the removal of another entry.
Flushing the remotes of a (*, G) entry also removes the (S, G) entries
that were created for its source list, once they are left without
remotes:
vxlan_mdb_remotes_flush()
-> vxlan_mdb_remote_del()
-> vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_del()
-> vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del()
-> vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del()
-> __vxlan_mdb_del()
-> vxlan_mdb_entry_put()
Such an entry can be located after the (*, G) entry in the list, as
vxlan_mdb_entry_get() returns an existing entry without moving it to the
head of the list. This order is obtained by adding the (S, G) entry
before the (*, G) entry, the latter with NLM_F_REPLACE, as the addition
of the source otherwise fails with -EEXIST. The (S, G) entry is then the
entry saved by hlist_for_each_entry_safe() and it is freed while the
(*, G) entry is processed. The next iteration calls hlist_del() on it
again, writing LIST_POISON1 to LIST_POISON2 [1].
Besides device deletion, the flush is also reachable from RTM_DELMDB
with NLM_F_BULK.
Fix by re-reading the next entry after the remotes were flushed. The
current entry cannot be removed by this flush, as source lists can only
be configured on (*, G) entries and the removed entries are (S, G)
entries. It is therefore still linked and its next pointer reflects the
removals.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in vxlan_mdb_entry_put.part.0+0x328/0x588
Write of size 8 at addr dead000000000122 by task ip/327
CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 327 Comm: ip Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7 #2 PREEMPT
Call trace:
vxlan_mdb_entry_put.part.0+0x328/0x588
vxlan_mdb_flush+0x1d8/0x25c
vxlan_mdb_fini+0x8c/0x100
vxlan_uninit+0x1c/0x7c
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x954/0xd4c
rtnl_dellink+0x210/0x530
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x434/0x4d0
netlink_rcv_skb+0xc4/0x204
rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x24
netlink_unicast+0x4b8/0x548
netlink_sendmsg+0x29c/0x560
____sys_sendmsg+0x390/0x3ec
___sys_sendmsg+0x114/0x188
__sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x178
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x48/0x60
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x58/0x180
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x74/0x140
do_el0_svc+0x30/0x40
el0_svc+0x38/0x98
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_init_acl()
A lockdep warning indicates a circular locking dependency between
`&oi->ip_xattr_sem` and `&journal->j_trans_barrier`:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
is trying to acquire lock:
(&oi->ip_xattr_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_init_acl+0x2fd/0x7e0
fs/ocfs2/acl.c:367
but task is already holding lock:
(&journal->j_trans_barrier){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_start_trans+0x3ab/0x700
fs/ocfs2/journal.c:369
The deadlock involves two code paths: Path 1 (setxattr) where
`ocfs2_xattr_set()` acquires `ip_xattr_sem` (write) and then starts a
transaction, which acquires `j_trans_barrier` (read); and Path 2
(mkdir/mknod) where `ocfs2_mknod()` starts a transaction (`j_trans_barrier`
read) and then calls `ocfs2_init_acl()`, which attempts to acquire
`ip_xattr_sem` (read) on the parent directory to retrieve the default ACL.
Because rw_semaphores are subject to writer priority, a pending writer on
`j_trans_barrier` (e.g., the journal commit thread) can cause Path 1 to
block, while Path 2 is blocked waiting for Path 1 to release
`ip_xattr_sem`.
The patch fixes the lock ordering by precomputing the ACL state before
starting the OCFS2 transaction, while preserving POSIX ACL storage
semantics and the existing inode/security initialization order. By reading
the parent directory's default ACL and preparing the new inode's ACLs
outside the transaction, `ip_xattr_sem` is always acquired before
`j_trans_barrier`.
`struct ocfs2_acl_state` encapsulates the prepared ACL state, while
`ocfs2_acl_init_prepare()` and `ocfs2_acl_init_release()` avoid code
duplication between `ocfs2_mknod()` and `ocfs2_init_security_and_acl()`.
`ocfs2_calc_xattr_init()` and `ocfs2_init_acl()` use this precomputed
state, removing internal `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition and redundant disk
reads.
Additionally, remove the `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition from
`ocfs2_xattr_set_handle()`. This function is only used while initializing a
new inode that has not yet been inserted into the inode hash or attached to
a dentry, meaning there is no risk of concurrent access and the lock is
unnecessary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/isolation: Defer freeing of cpumask memblock memory to initcall
When testing a linux-next kernel with commit 59bd1d914bb5 ("memblock:
warn when freeing reserved memory before memory map is initialized"),
the following warning was hit when there was a "nohz_full" kernel boot
parameter.
Cannot free reserved memory because of deferred initialization of the memory map
WARNING: mm/memblock.c:904 at __free_reserved_area+0xde/0xf0, CPU#0: swapper/0/0
:
Call Trace:
<TASK>
memblock_phys_free+0xcb/0x100
housekeeping_init+0x14c/0x170
start_kernel+0x207/0x450
x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
x86_64_start_kernel+0xda/0xe0
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
</TASK>
IOW, we shouldn't free memblock allocated memory so early
in the boot process when memory map isn't fully initialized in
deferred_init_memmap().
Fix it by saving the housekeeping cpumask memblock memory to be
freed into a llist free list in housekeeping_init() and add a new
housekeeping_late_init() helper to defer the actual freeing of memblock
memory to when initcall's are being processed. The cpumask memblock
memory is treated as a llist_node with the size of a "long" type which
is also smallest cpumask size that can be allocated.
The non-atomic version of the llist APIs are used as there is no
contention.
This commit depends on the presence of commit 7c2eee9c1367 ("memblock:
don't touch memblock arrays when memblock_free() is called late")
to prevent a KASAN UAF bug report [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260505051821.1107133-1-longman@redhat.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: handle nogenerate/noverify properly in fs-integrity
Check the BIP_CHECK flags before generating or verifying PI information,
otherwise this can be incorrectly called for non-PI metadata and
cause generation of incorrect metadata and crashed in the verification
handler.
The new behavior matches that of the block layer auto-generated
metadata. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/irq: Fix missing r2 clobber in PCREL inline assembly
In CONFIG_PPC_KERNEL_PCREL mode, r2 is no longer reserved for the TOC
pointer and is available as a caller-saved register [0].
Both call_do_irq() and call_do_softirq() use inline assembly to call
functions with stack switching, but fail to list r2 in their clobber
lists. This causes the compiler to assume r2 is preserved across these
calls, leading to register corruption when the called functions
(__do_irq and __do_softirq) clobber r2.
As a result of this kernel crash during interrupt handling is seen and
the kernel fails to boot:
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xc000000404697638
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000181ec
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
NIP [c0000000000181ec] __do_IRQ+0x6c/0xc0
With older GCC, the compiler would conservatively allocate
callee-saved registers (like r31) for values spanning function calls,
accidentally avoiding the bug:
<__do_IRQ>:
00 00 00 60 nop
a6 02 08 7c mflr r0
f8 ff e1 fb std r31,-8(r1)
f0 ff c1 fb std r30,-16(r1)
2d 03 10 06 pla r31,53297316
...
3d e8 ff 4b bl c0000000000165ac <__do_irq>
00 00 21 e8 ld r1,0(r1)
28 00 4d e9 ld r10,40(r13)
40 00 21 38 addi r1,r1,64
2a f9 aa 7f stdx r29,r10,r31
With newer GCC 14, the compiler uses r2 for such values, exposing the
missing clobber specification:
<__do_IRQ>:
00 00 00 60 nop
a6 02 08 7c mflr r0
f0 ff c1 fb std r30,-16(r1)
f8 ff e1 fb std r31,-8(r1)
29 02 10 06 pla r2,36252592 # c0000000022aadc0 <__irq_regs>
...
85 dc ff 4b bl c000000000015ee0 <__do_irq>
00 00 21 e8 ld r1,0(r1)
28 00 2d e9 ld r9,40(r13)
30 00 21 38 addi r1,r1,48
2a 11 c9 7f stdx r30,r9,r2
Fix this by adding r2 to the clobber list for both call_do_irq() and
call_do_softirq() when CONFIG_PPC_KERNEL_PCREL is enabled.
[0]: https://www.mail-archive.com/gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org/msg313226.html |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/xive: propagate IPI init errors to prevent use-after-free
When xive_init_ipis() fails (e.g. irq_domain_alloc_irqs() fails),
the error path frees the global xive_ipis array. However,
xive_smp_probe() previously ignored this failure and proceeded to
call xive_setup_cpu_ipi(), which dereferences the already-freed
xive_ipis pointer -- a use-after-free.
Now that xive_smp_probe() returns int (previous patch), propagate
the error from xive_init_ipis() and xive_setup_cpu_ipi() through
xive_smp_probe(). Check the return value in both pnv_smp_probe()
and pSeries_smp_probe() so that IPI setup is aborted cleanly on
failure, avoiding the use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/efa: Fix PBL chunk length computation
On register MR, when creating the PBL, if it's an indirect PBL we create
a chunk list to hold the PBL pages pointers. Each chunk is 4KB in size
and can hold 510 addresses (EFA_PTRS_PER_CHUNK) and has a 12-byte
control buffer at the end of it holding the next chunk's pointer and its
length.
If the PBL number of pages is a multiple of EFA_PTRS_PER_CHUNK, the
calculated last chunk length is wrongly computed as 0, even though that
chunk is fully populated with 510 real page pointers. This wrong length
is used both to DMA map the chunk and is propagated to the device,
causing the device to see the chunk as empty and reject the memory
registration.
Fix the calculation so it will be performed only if the number of pages
isn't a multiple of EFA_PTRS_PER_CHUNK, if it is, its already handled in
the above loop correctly.
Also prevent out-of-bounds reach in the chunks array in such scenario. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: qcom_wcnss: Fix handling the lack of PD regulators in v3
The changes introduced to handle single power domain platforms have
swapped the info pointer increment from num_pd_vregs to num_pds, which
would shift the info pointer past the end of the array for pronto-v3,
which does not list power domain regulators in vregs.
This showed up as a difference between GCC- and LLVM-compiled kernels
on SDM632 devices, where only with LLVM one would get the
"regulator request with no identifier" error, because the out-of-bounds
memory ended up being zeroed. Fix by skipping the increment when there
are more power domains than regulators. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: bcm2835: Don't remove an unregistered GPIO chip
If the devm_pinctrl_register() function fails,
bcm2835_pinctrl_probe() calls gpiochip_remove()
before gpiochip_add_data() has registered the GPIO chip.
This means that upon failure the gpio_chip.gpiodev
is NULL resulting in a null pointer dereference
inside the gpiochip_remove() function.
Remove the unnecessary function call to gpiochip_remove().
No GPIO cleanup is required because the GPIO chip
has not yet been registered. Without this change there
is potential for a kernel panic upon registration failure |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: restore active device pointers after failed sprout
btrfs_init_new_device() switches latest_dev and possibly s_bdev from the
seed device to the new sprout device before creating the first writable
chunks.
If chunk creation or the subsequent sprout setup fails, the error path
releases the new device without switching those pointers back.
btrfs_show_devname() can then dereference the freed latest_dev and crash.
Restore the active device pointers to the latest seed device before
removing and releasing the failed sprout device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: Fix potential double-free at error path
The fix for caiaq driver's resource management to handle the errors
tries to release the resources in a common destructor call, but as a
sashiko review for another patch suggested, some of the audio
resources such as URBs have been already freed, and this may lead to a
double-free.
For addressing the double-free, call the common destructor function
from each place, and assure that the resource pointers get cleared. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Clean up the bus when fetching ML caps fails
snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_ml_capabilities() may fail and its return code
shall be checked and accounted for. Address the issue by updating the
error-path for avs_pci_probe().
At the same time, if the function in question succeeds but the next part
of avs_pci_probe() fails, the hlink list shall be cleaned up before
leaving the scope. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Keep refcount_acquire nullable for borrowed RCU kptrs
bpf_refcount_acquire() is fallible for a borrowed reference because the
object may have reached a zero refcount. The verifier therefore keeps
KF_RET_NULL on the return value unless the argument is an owning reference.
An RCU-protected load of a local kptr is marked MEM_ALLOC, but it only
receives NON_OWN_REF when the pointee contains a graph node. A refcounted
object without a graph node consequently looks like an owning reference
even though the loaded register has no acquired reference state. If the
program drops the last real reference while remaining in the RCU critical
section, refcount_inc_not_zero() returns NULL while the verifier treats the
result as non-NULL.
Only classify the argument as owning when it is backed by a verifier-tracked
reference. This retains the non-NULL return for pointers from bpf_obj_new(),
bpf_kptr_xchg(), or an earlier successful acquisition, while requiring a
NULL check for borrowed RCU kptrs.
[ kkd: Rewrote commit log ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark NULL kptr stores precise
check_map_kptr_access() permits a scalar store into an untrusted kptr
field only when the register is known to contain zero. Unlike other
verifier checks whose outcome depends on a scalar value, it does not mark
that register precise.
A state checkpoint reached with an imprecise zero can therefore prune a
second path that reaches the store with an arbitrary nonzero scalar. The
program can write attacker-controlled bits into the kptr field and load
them back as a PTR_TO_BTF_ID.
Call mark_chain_precision() before accepting a known-zero register. This
forces state equivalence to compare its scalar range and makes the verifier
visit and reject a path carrying a nonzero value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: ets: clamp quantum in parse and fallback paths
ets_qdisc_change() falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor for bands
without an explicit quantum. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len
reaches ~2 GiB, so a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device makes the
deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock.
Move the floor into ets_quantum_parse() so explicitly configured quanta
are also clamped to [256, 1<<20], not just the fallback path.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root ets bands 3 strict 2 quanta 1 1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: cope with concurrent instance destruction
Instances are refcounted. However, only memory release happens on the
1 -> 0 transition; the unlink from hashes can occur with any refcount.
Uncooperative userspace can force a situation where a queue is pending
for destruction from netlink event while a different socket with same
portid processes an UNBIND request.
With right timing, this will unhash the instance again:
Oops: general protection fault, [..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nfulnl_recv_config+0x31a/0xd50
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7c2/0xeb0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Update last skb marker in manage_oob().
Fahad Alharbi reported that blocking recv(MSG_PEEK) could hog CPU
due to OOB skb.
In the following cases, manage_oob() skips OOB skb(s) and returns
NULL for the last recv(MSG_PEEK):
socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sk);
1) skb -> OOB skb -> NULL
send(sk[0], "ab", 2, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 0, MSG_PEEK);
2) skb -> consumed OOB skb -> NULL
send(sk[0], "ab", 2, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 1, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 0, MSG_PEEK);
3) consumed OOB skb -> OOB skb -> NULL
send(sk[0], "a", 1, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 0, MSG_OOB);
send(sk[0], "b", 1, MSG_OOB);
recv(sk[1], buf, 1, MSG_PEEK);
Then, @copied is 0 in unix_stream_read_generic() (zero-length buffer,
or non-OOB skb is not yet consumed), and unix_stream_data_wait() is
called.
However, it returns immediately because @last is not updated in
unix_stream_read_generic(), and the thread busy-waits for a new skb.
Let's update @last in manage_oob().
For MSG_PEEK, @last is updated with the skipped OOB, and for the
non-peek case, @last matches the returned value (when !copied)
because OOB is unlinked.
Note that manage_oob() is inlined and no stack canary is added. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: ice: don't dereference pointers from TP_printk()
After forwarding net-next during the v7.3 merge window we started
seeing:
TRACE EVENT ERROR: Event ice_tx_dim_work has double dereference in TP_printk: REC->q_vector->tx.tx_ring->q_index
WARNING: kernel/trace/trace_events.c:420 at test_double_dereference.cold+0x39/0x4b
this is due to extra checks added in tracing subsystem in
commit b5cc230af5e5 ("tracing: Warn when an event dereferences a pointer in TP_printk()").
Printing happens long after the event was recorded, by which point
the pointers may be invalid (the ring or the dim instance).
Copy the eight scalars into the event instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate packet_len before skb_put_data
btintel_pcie_submit_rx_work() reads packet_len from rfh_hdr without
checking if it exceeds the RX buffer size. An oversized packet_len
can lead to an out-of-bounds read in skb_put_data().
Validate packet_len to ensure it is non-zero and does not exceed
BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(*rfh_hdr), logging an error when
invalid.
This issue was reported by Claude Mythos. It can be simulated either by
using customized firmware configured to return an invalid packet_len or
by modifying rfh_hdr->packet_len in the driver before calling
btintel_pcie_submit_rx_work(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/alternatives: Exclude text poking against change_page_attr()
From time to time, the following BUG can be observed
in the x86 alternatives patching code [0]:
> kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2576!
> Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 355 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed 8c1795b03ec64f997e57a8ad38b1161e3b98da64
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
> RIP: 0010:__text_poke+0x2aa/0x450
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x2a7/0x320
> __static_call_transform+0xb7/0x220
> arch_static_call_transform+0x5b/0xb0
> __static_call_init+0xe9/0x270
> static_call_module_notify+0x11f/0x150
> notifier_call_chain+0x61/0xe0
> blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x63/0xc0
> load_module+0x1c92/0x20c0
> init_module_from_file+0xd8/0x140
> idempotent_init_module+0x100/0x2f0
> __x64_sys_finit_module+0x71/0xe0
> do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
which matches the following BUG_ON() in alternative.c:
/*
* If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not
* implemented.
*/
BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]));
This can happen if vmalloc_to_page() fails, for any reason. Such can happen
if text poking races with CPA, which can possibly result in the collapsing
of page tables (or breaking of PMD hugepages). It is not a problem for most
users of vmalloc_to_page() (they solely own the vmalloc'd range) but, when
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX=y, various modules own a single execmem vmalloc
range, and can call set_memory_*() in parallel on it. This can happen to
race against __text_poke and cause havoc in vmalloc_to_page().
Fix it by excluding against CPA using the init_mm mmap read lock.
[ dhansen: Fix up SoB ordering. The actual code flow here was:
Pedro=>Lorenzo=>Mike=>Me which is reflected in the SoB chain
now. I *believe* Mike simply picked up Lorenzo's update to
Pedro's post from the Link ] |
