| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: scd30: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a zero check for val2 before using it as a divisor when setting the
sampling frequency. A user writing a zero fractional part to the
sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the
kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies
mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed
MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without
checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback
can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the
reply.
Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial
replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized
reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of
overwriting st->buf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it
as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs
attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location
itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and
fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the
parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer
slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address
of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type
mismatch.
i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16)
= 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when
the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in
itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so
iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack
contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a
functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is
delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak.
The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through
itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value,
where that is correct.
Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's
buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: nxp-sar-adc: fix division by zero in write_raw
Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it
as a divisor. A user writing zero or a negative value to the
sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the
kernel.
Also prevent unsigned integer underflow when the computed cycle count is
smaller than NXP_SAR_ADC_CONV_TIME, which would wrap the u32 inpsamp to
a huge value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp
In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read()
but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains
uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported
as a measurement result.
Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported
in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage.
This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the
variable as used uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button
xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length
and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or
data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's
control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with
actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing
accesses beyond the actual array.
Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the
packet length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn
__set_chan_timer() takes a l2cap_chan reference via l2cap_chan_hold()
before scheduling the delayed work. The normal path in
l2cap_chan_timeout() drops this reference with l2cap_chan_put() at the
end, but the early return when chan->conn is NULL skips the put,
leaking the reference.
Add the missing l2cap_chan_put() before the early return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store()
linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before
checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the
message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]:
write(fd, "", 0);
-> message_store(..., buf, count=0)
-> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0)
-> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read
The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation
(kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0),
so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a
KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and
panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data
and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count--
wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul().
linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs
callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute,
mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with
count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via
zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on
count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store
callback regardless.
Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The
existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path
unchanged.
Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via
linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959,
img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one
Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like
folio_referenced_one() does.
Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call
can be reused on a later iteration that does not run
folio_unmap_pte_batch() again.
mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call
madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via
HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE.
Trigger node reclaim through sysfs. Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will
first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio.
This will set nr_pages to 15. In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets
reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio
refcount/mapcount.
At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit
out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there
are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap
(which too I am investigating). I did a one liner kernel change to avoid
going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at
folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted.
Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree
folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios.
Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to
refcount/mapcount corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA
device is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA). On any other device
type, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but
the event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the
RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans->cm_handle_connect(),
and (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and
ESTABLISHED cases.
An RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as
soon as a connect request arrives: with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
the wild load becomes a NULL dereference at offset 0xa0
(&trans->cm_handle_connect) in the iw_cm_wq workqueue.
GCC masks the bug in default builds by folding the uninitialized
load into &rds_ib_transport; Clang-built kernels take the real
uninitialized path and oops.
The active side can land on a non-IB device too: the id that
rds_ib_conn_path_connect() creates is not restricted to a node type,
so rdma_resolve_addr() binds it to whichever device serves the local
address, and an iWARP RNIC on the same netdev qualifies. The crash
there is different: resolving a route on an iWARP id never fills in
cm_id->route.path_rec, and the ROUTE_RESOLVED case writes
path_rec[0].sl before it calls into the transport.
The iWARP transport was dropped long ago and IB is the only
transport left, so make that explicit: initialize trans to
&rds_ib_transport at declaration, drop the conditional assignment,
reject a connect request that arrives on a non-IB device, and drop a
connection whose address resolved to one instead of resolving a
route on it. The rejection is limited to RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST
on purpose: a non-zero return from the handler makes rdma_cm destroy
the id the event was delivered on, which is right for the request's
freshly created id but would free a connection id that RDS still owns
for any other event. On the active side the id stays ic->i_cm_id and
the connection's shutdown destroys it, so that case returns 0.
[achender: reject only on RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST instead of
bailing out for every event on a non-IB device, so that rdma_cm does
not destroy connection ids RDS still tracks; drop a connection whose
address resolved to a non-IB device before a route is resolved on it;
changelog adjusted] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait
When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association
establishment before building its data chunks. The wait drops the socket
lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the
peer-advertised inbound stream count. sctp_stream_init() then frees the
extension of every removed stream.
The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait. If the
peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL
extension. Fatal-oops policies then panic the host.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x38-0x3f]
RIP: sctp_outq_tail+0x49e/0xaa0
Call Trace:
sctp_primitive_SEND
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc
sctp_sendmsg
A range check alone is insufficient. Stream reconfiguration can grow the
output count again while the lock is released without recreating extensions
freed by the earlier shrink. The stream can then be in range while its
extension remains NULL. The send-buffer wait has the same issue.
Factor the range and extension checks into a helper and repeat both after
each send-path wait that drops the socket lock. Once the lock is
reacquired, the validation remains stable through data creation and
queueing.
If validation fails after the connect wait, the auto-created association is
already established. Return ESRCH so the existing caller path keeps it
under state-machine ownership instead of freeing it directly, which would
leave protocol, counter and socket state inconsistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: viai2c-wmt: Fix clock leak in wmt_i2c_probe()
In wmt_i2c_probe(), i2c->clk is acquired using of_clk_get(). If any
subsequent operation fails or when the module is unloaded, the clock
reference count is never decremented via clk_put(), leading to a
resource leak.
Switch to devm_clk_get() so that the clock is automatically managed
and released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Do not show buffer_meta for CPUs without a buffer
The per_cpu/cpuN/buffer_meta files are created for every possible CPU,
but buffer->buffers[cpu] is only allocated once that CPU comes online.
Reading the file of a CPU that never came online dereferences a NULL
cpu_buffer in rbm_start().
Fail the open with -ENODEV when the CPU has no buffer, as the other
per CPU ring buffer interfaces do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix the sub-buffer array base in rb_meta_subbuf_idx()
On a persistent ring buffer, rb_meta_subbuf_idx() can return an index one
sub-buffer too high. rb_setup_ids_meta_page() then fills subbuf_ids[]
shifted by one and leaves subbuf_ids[0] NULL, which __rb_map_vma()
dereferences when userspace maps trace_pipe_raw. rb_update_meta_reader()
writes two such indices into meta->buffers[], which rb_cpu_meta_valid()
would reject on the next boot, discarding the previous boot's trace.
A CPU's sub-buffer array starts after its meta header and the nr_subbufs
integers that follow, aligned up to a sub-buffer. rb_meta_subbuf_idx()
inverts that calculation but skips only the integers, not the header, so
its base is one sub-buffer low whenever the omitted header size crosses
the alignment boundary.
Invert the calculation with rb_subbufs_from_meta() rather than repeating
it. rb_range_buffer() maps an index back to an address through the same
helper, so the two directions can no longer disagree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix false warning in ring_buffer_map_get_reader()
The mmap reader can warn when it catches up with a writer that is still
committing events. rb_get_reader_page() returns NULL in this case, but
ring_buffer_map_get_reader() treats that result as an error.
The initial rb_per_cpu_empty() check filters out an empty buffer, but it
does not guarantee that the next reader page has committed data. Writers
do not take reader_lock and can advance commit_page before publishing the
committed length on the new page. rb_get_reader_page() can swap to that
page, catch up with the writer and return NULL.
Handle NULL through the existing no-data exit without warning. Remove the
caller's reader_page == commit_page check as well, since the reader-page
helper already handles that case. The existing metadata update and return
path remain in place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies
bsg-lib allocates a 96-byte (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) reply buffer per
job, but struct ufs_rpmb_reply is 104 bytes: a 40-byte struct
ufs_bsg_reply followed by a 64-byte EHS. When an Advanced RPMB command
returns an EHS, ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() copies it right after
the 40-byte header and writes 8 bytes past the end of the buffer.
Let each BSG transport pass its reply buffer size to bsg_setup_queue()
and have ufs_bsg request sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply), so the full
reply reaches user space. Other transports keep SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response
scsifront_do_response() validates the rqid in a backend response against
VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS before using it to index info->shadow[], but then
dereferences the entry to test ->inflight without checking that the slot
is populated. Shadow slots are NULL before a command is submitted (the
host private area is zeroed at allocation) and are reset to NULL in
_scsifront_put_rqid() once a request completes, so an in-range rqid that
does not correspond to an outstanding request makes the frontend
dereference a NULL pointer.
A malicious or buggy backend can thus crash the guest by returning a
response whose rqid is in range but not in flight -- for example a
spurious response before any command has been issued, or a duplicate of
one already completed. The ring has only VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS (16) slots,
so before the first command every in-range rqid selects a NULL slot.
Reject a response whose shadow slot is not populated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_compat: ebtables emulation must reject non-bridge targets
xtables targets return netfilter verdicts: NF_ACCEPT, NF_DROP, and so
on. ebtables targets return incompatible verdicts: EBT_ACCEPT,
EBT_DROP, ... We cannot allow fallback to NFPROTO_UNSPEC.
ebtables doesn't permit this since
11ff7288beb2 ("netfilter: ebtables: reject non-bridge targets")
but that commit missed the nft_compat layer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
srcu: Use irq_work to start GP in tiny SRCU
Tiny SRCU's srcu_gp_start_if_needed() directly calls schedule_work(),
which acquires the workqueue pool->lock.
This causes a lockdep splat when call_srcu() is called with a scheduler
lock held, due to:
call_srcu() [holding pi_lock]
srcu_gp_start_if_needed()
schedule_work() -> pool->lock
workqueue_init() / create_worker() [holding pool->lock]
wake_up_process() -> try_to_wake_up() -> pi_lock
Also add irq_work_sync() to cleanup_srcu_struct() to prevent a
use-after-free if a queued irq_work fires after cleanup begins.
Tested with rcutorture SRCU-T and no lockdep warnings.
[ Thanks to Boqun for similar fix in patch "rcu: Use an intermediate irq_work
to start process_srcu()" ] |
