| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: E-Switch: fix use-after-free in mlx5_eswitch_termtbl_put
In mlx5_eswitch_termtbl_put(), the zero-ref cleanup check reads
tt->ref_count after termtbl_mutex has been released. Two concurrent
callers on the same mlx5_termtbl_handle race: one decrements ref_count
to zero, removes the hash entry, and calls kfree(tt) while the other
has already dropped the mutex and is about to evaluate
if (!tt->ref_count), producing a use-after-free.
Fix this by capturing the result of the decrement into a stack-local
last variable before dropping the mutex. The cleanup decision is now
made entirely under termtbl_mutex, and tt is not touched after
kfree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: E-Switch, prevent mc_list repopulation during vport disable
In mlx5_esw_vport_disable(), move esw_apply_vport_rx_mode() ahead
of esw_vport_change_handle_locked() so vport->allmulti_rule is
NULL before the change handler observes it.
During FW-fatal recovery the disable runs while dev->state ==
INTERNAL_ERROR. The promisc query inside esw_update_vport_rx_mode()
fails and returns early, leaving vport->allmulti_rule intact, so
esw_update_vport_mc_promisc() runs and adds MLX5_ACTION_ADD entries
to vport->mc_list whose flow rules are then installed in the FDB
by esw_add_mc_addr(). esw_destroy_legacy_table() tears down the
FDB with those refs still held, corrupting the sub-tree and
leaving dangling flow_rule pointers in vport->mc_list.
Two-stage failure on `echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/<bdf>/reset`:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
tree_put_node+0xef/0x110 [mlx5_core]
clean_tree+0x44/0xd0 [mlx5_core] (x5)
mlx5_fs_core_cleanup+0x57/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload+0x65/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
... mlx5_health_try_recover
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000003000055
down_write+0x1c/0x60
mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x33/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
esw_del_mc_addr+0x7b/0x170 [mlx5_core]
esw_apply_vport_addr_list+0x56/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
esw_vport_change_handle_locked+0x28b/0x310 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_esw_vport_enable+0x270/0x4a0 [mlx5_core]
... mlx5_load ... mlx5_health_try_recover
esw_apply_vport_rx_mode(false, false) clears vport->allmulti_rule
via its local state machine even when the FW del fails. With the
rule NULL the !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(allmulti_rule) gate in the change
handler closes, no rules are installed during disable, and the
reload starts with a clean mc_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_pie: clamp quantum in change path
fq_pie_change() accepts any quantum value from userspace, including 1.
With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1
makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock
(a soft lockup / denial of service).
Add max(256U, ...) matching fq_codel_change().
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ_PIE=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root fq_pie
tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root fq_pie quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum in change path
sfq_change() accepts any non-negative quantum (only rejects
(int)ctl->quantum < 0). With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches
~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times
under the qdisc lock (a soft lockup / denial of service).
Add max(256U, ...) matching fq_codel_change(). Reject quantum > 1<<20
with -EINVAL, matching fq_codel_change() and the init clamp.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_SFQ=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root sfq
tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root sfq quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum in change and init paths
hhf_change() accepts any quantum from userspace, including 1. With a
crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes
the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock
(a soft lockup / denial of service).
Add max(256U, ...) in hhf_change() matching fq_codel_change(). Clamp
hhf_init() to [256, 1<<20] matching the siblings, and remove the old
fallback that only set quantum=256 on overflow.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_HHF=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root hhf
tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root hhf quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: drr: clamp quantum in change class
drr_change_class() rejects explicit quantum==0 but falls back to
psched_mtu() with no floor. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len
reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 (or a zero psched_mtu on a headerless
device) makes the deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock.
Add clamp_t(u32, quantum, 256, 1<<20) after the zero reject and on the
fallback path. The explicit-zero reject is preserved.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root drr
tc class add dev dummy0 parent 1: classid 1:1 drr quantum 1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: ets: clamp quantum in parse and fallback paths
ets_qdisc_change() falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor for bands
without an explicit quantum. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len
reaches ~2 GiB, so a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device makes the
deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock.
Move the floor into ets_quantum_parse() so explicitly configured quanta
are also clamped to [256, 1<<20], not just the fallback path.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root ets bands 3 strict 2 quanta 1 1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: fix NULL pointer dereference on unbind with fixed-link
When the device tree describes a fixed-link and has no "mdio" child
node, macb_mii_init() returns early without allocating the MDIO bus,
leaving bp->mii_bus as NULL.
Two cleanup paths then dereference this NULL bus:
1. On driver unbind, macb_remove() unconditionally calls
mdiobus_unregister(bp->mii_bus), which oopses:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000004a8
pc : mdiobus_unregister+0x14/0xa4
lr : macb_remove+0x38/0xa4
Call trace:
mdiobus_unregister+0x14/0xa4 (P)
macb_remove+0x38/0xa4
platform_remove+0x20/0x30
device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x224
unbind_store+0xb4/0xbc
2. On the probe error path in macb_probe(), reached when
macb_mii_init() has succeeded but a subsequent step fails, the
err_out_unregister_mdio label runs the same unconditional cleanup.
mdiobus_unregister() and mdiobus_free() do not guard against a NULL
bus, so guard the calls in both macb_remove() and the probe error
path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts
bpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged
programs may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg()
lets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks.
Since commit bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop
callback iterations"), the verifier marks R1 precise and reads its upper
bound to limit callback simulation. Precision backtracking only accepts
scalar registers, so passing a pointer instead triggers the "backtracking
misuse" verifier warning. Kernels with panic_on_warn enabled subsequently
panic.
Introduce ARG_SCALAR for helper arguments that only accept scalar values
and use it for bpf_loop() nr_loops. Generic helper argument validation then
rejects pointers before loop inlining and precision processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: Decoupling ep1_in_urb in caiaq dev
The epq_in_urb object belonging to the caiaq device is coupled within
the struct snd_usb_caiaqdev. After usb_submit_urb(epq_in_urb, GFP_KERNEL)
executes successfully, epq_in_urb is successfully added to the urbp_list
queue of the dummy HCD driver (userspace specifies dummy_hcd as the HCD
layer driver for the caiaq USB device).
When init_card() calls snd_usb_caiaq_send_command() which subsequently
fails due to a timeout, and proceeds to call snd_card_free() to release
the card, the embedded ep1_in_urb object is also freed. When the dummy
HCD driver detects that the URB has been unlinked, it returns the URB
(by usb_hcd_giveback_urb()), which triggers [1].
Decouple the ep1_in_urb object from the struct snd_usb_caiaqdev and switch
to using a pointer instead. Separately allocate and manage the memory for
ep1_in_urb to prevent the release of the snd_card memory object from
interfering with it.
midi_out_urb has the same issue as ep1_in_urb and is handled in the same
way.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_free_urb+0x24/0x120 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88803cee1050 by task ktimers/1/29
Call Trace:
usb_free_urb+0x24/0x120 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96
dummy_timer+0xaac/0x4d50 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2019
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2067 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x3eb/0xaf0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2124
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x1e1/0x2e0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2141
Allocated by task 36:
snd_card_new+0x7b/0x110 sound/core/init.c:184
create_card sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:429 [inline]
snd_probe+0x236/0x1af0 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:544
Freed by task 36:
snd_card_free_when_closed sound/core/init.c:630 [inline]
snd_card_free+0x138/0x1d0 sound/core/init.c:662
snd_probe+0x162b/0x1af0 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:553 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: delimit inode_share cache key components
Previously, inode_share keys were encoded as follows:
fingerprint || domain_id
It would be better to have a separator between the fingerprint and domain
ID so that the fingerprint won't be parsed as part of a domain ID.
Change the key encoding as follows:
domain_id || '\0' || fingerprint
Since domain_id is a NUL-terminated string, this makes the in-memory key
indices unambiguous. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/riscv: Serialize command queue publishing
Serialize command queue publishing so software producer state advances only
after a command is written and the hardware tail is updated. Wait for
hardware consumption outside the queue lock when the command queue is full
so other CPUs are not blocked behind a long poll. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Do not reallocate GA log buffers on resume
Commit c5e1a1eb9279 ("iommu/amd: Simplify and Consolidate Virtual APIC
(AVIC) Enablement") moved the GA log allocation from iommu_init_pci()
to enable_iommus_vapic(), which is called on every resume.
iommu_init_ga_log() assigns iommu->ga_log and iommu->ga_log_tail
unconditionally. Each resume therefore replaces the boot-time pointers
and leaks both old allocations. The function also uses GFP_KERNEL from a
syscore resume callback, where interrupts are disabled and the non-boot
CPUs are offline.
Return early if both buffers are already allocated. Clear the pointers
in free_ga_log() so a partial allocation failure cannot leave ga_log
dangling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Fix ineffective error check in nested domain allocation
amd_iommu_pdom_id_alloc() returns an int: a domain ID on success, or the
negative errno from ida_alloc_range() when the ID space is exhausted or
memory is short. amd_iommu_alloc_domain_nested() stores that return value
in gdom_info->hdom_id, which is a u32, and only then tests it:
gdom_info->hdom_id = amd_iommu_pdom_id_alloc();
if (gdom_info->hdom_id <= 0) {
The assignment discards the sign, so -ENOSPC becomes 0xffffffe4 and the
test never fires. The nested domain is then set up with a host domain ID
that was never allocated, instead of the allocation failing with -ENOSPC.
Keep the value in an int, test it there, and store it only once it is
known to be valid, which is what the other amd_iommu_pdom_id_alloc()
callers already do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (ltc4282) Make sure clk_init_data is fully initialized
The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members
for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock,
prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However,
not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only
exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is
enabled.
ltc428_clk_provider_setup() does not fill in any parent clocks, and
assumes that init.num_parents is NULL. However, the latter in
uninitialized, and thus may cause a crash.
Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to
avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for
specifying the parents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: Fix potential UAF in pec_store
Sashiko reports:
In pec_store(), a guard(mutex)(&hwdev->lock) is taken. If the chip write
operation returns an error other than -EOPNOTSUPP, the code jumps to the
put label, which calls put_device(hdev). If this drops the final reference,
the device is freed. When the function then returns, the guard cleanup
function runs and attempts to unlock the freed mutex.
Use scoped_guard() instead of guard() to avoid the problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: cope with concurrent instance destruction
Instances are refcounted. However, only memory release happens on the
1 -> 0 transition; the unlink from hashes can occur with any refcount.
Uncooperative userspace can force a situation where a queue is pending
for destruction from netlink event while a different socket with same
portid processes an UNBIND request.
With right timing, this will unhash the instance again:
Oops: general protection fault, [..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nfulnl_recv_config+0x31a/0xd50
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7c2/0xeb0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_ring: fix stale descriptor flags after a failed packed add
In a packed ring the AVAIL and USED bits sit in the descriptor itself,
so writing them makes that descriptor available. Those bit combinations
flip meaning on every round of the ring, tracked by a wrap counter, so
invalidating or validating a descriptor means inverting both bits.
Commit 1ce9e6055fa0 ("virtio_ring: introduce packed ring support") has
virtqueue_add_packed() make every descriptor of a chain available as it
maps the chain, and write the head last. The device consumes the ring in
order and stops at a head that is not available yet, so it never reaches
the rest.
When vring_map_one_sg() fails partway, unmap_release unmaps the segments
and restores avail_used_flags, but the descriptors it wrote to in the
ring stay marked with AVAIL and USED bits. The head is now the only
entry that keeps the device from consuming these stale entries.
For example, the ring would look like this now.
Z - pre-previous command
A - previous command
B - aborted command
C - current command
[A1 DONE] [A2 DONE] <C1 EMPTY> [B2] [B3] [Z1 DONE]
When the driver now attempts to issue the C command, the next add starts
at the same head as B. If C spans less descriptors than B, there is no
end marker because AVAIL and USED bits were still in place. And that
means the device will start interpreting these stale entries (B2/B3) as
another command entry, which then blocks the queue.
This effect typically happens in swiotlb configurations under memory
pressure, because vring_map_one_sg() can then fail with larger I/O
requests which then leads to command abortions.
There are broadly 2 ways to avoid leaving those flags behind:
1) Defer those flags too until the chain is complete.
2) Rewrite those flags for the previous wrap counter.
Implement the second option in both packed add paths. The first option
traverses the chain a second time on every successful add. The second
option invalidates all added descriptors when any add fails.
With this patch applied, a packed virtqueue keeps completing requests
after a failed add. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio: fix use-after-free in unregister_virtio_device()
device_unregister() is device_del() plus put_device(). When the caller
holds no extra reference, that drops the last one and runs the release
callback, which for several transports frees the memory the embedded
struct virtio_device sits in. unregister_virtio_device() then calls
virtio_debug_device_exit(), which reads dev->debugfs_dir out of the freed
object.
Affected transports are the ones whose release callback frees and whose
remove path takes no reference: virtio_mmio, virtio_vdpa, virtio_uml,
mlxbf-tmfifo and virtio_ccw. virtio_pci is unaffected because
virtio_pci_remove() brackets the call with get_device() and put_device().
Remove the debugfs entries before the device can go away. They are only
accessed through the protected debugfs interface, so
debugfs_remove_recursive() waits for in-progress file operations before
returning. Tearing them down while the device is still alive is therefore
safe.
Reproduced on User-Mode Linux with CONFIG_KASAN and CONFIG_VIRTIO_DEBUG
by unbinding a virtio-uml device:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in virtio_debug_device_exit+0x36/0x4d
Read of size 8 at addr 00000000616e0b10 by task init/1
__asan_report_load8_noabort
virtio_debug_device_exit+0x36/0x4d
unregister_virtio_device+0x48/0x75
virtio_uml_remove
platform_remove
device_release_driver_internal
unbind_store
Freed by task 1:
kfree
virtio_uml_release_dev
device_release
kobject_put
put_device
device_unregister
With this applied, the report is gone and unbind is clean. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_console: do not free control-out buffers on remove
__send_control_msg() publishes &portdev->cpkt as the control-out
virtqueue cookie. remove_vqs() walks every virtqueue and passes leftover
cookies to free_buf(), which treats them as struct port_buffer and
reads sgpages.
If a control message is still on c_ovq when the device is unbound,
free_buf() reads past the ports_device object.
KASAN reported slab-out-of-bounds in free_buf():
free_buf
remove_vqs
virtcons_remove
unbind_store
The object was the ports_device allocated in virtcons_probe().
Drain c_ovq without freeing. The packet lives in portdev and is released
with it. |
