No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | mDNS string-cache lookup matches on slot size, so a peer name aliases a shorter one and the response encoder writes past the packet | mDNS string cache accepts a shorter name as a match for a longer stored one, so the known-answer encoder writes past the transmit packet |
Wed, 04 Nov 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its transmit packet. The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four: ```c /* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */ memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF; ... len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2)); /* slot size, not string length */ if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...) ``` The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size, so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string. Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names whose lengths fall in the same bucket: ``` ==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5 #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096 #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911 0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region ``` The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash. Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check agree. | In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, the mDNS add-on's string cache accepts a shorter name as a match for a longer stored one. A host on the local link can send two mDNS records that make a device performing continuous service discovery write up to three bytes past its transmit packet, corrupting a neighbouring packet or the pool's free list, and misattribute discovered records. |
| Weaknesses | CWE-697 |
Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Eclipse
Eclipse threadx Netx Duo |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Eclipse
Eclipse threadx Netx Duo |
Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Tue, 29 Sep 2026 18:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its transmit packet. The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four: ```c /* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */ memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF; ... len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2)); /* slot size, not string length */ if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...) ``` The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size, so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string. Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names whose lengths fall in the same bucket: ``` ==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5 #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096 #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911 0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region ``` The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash. Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check agree. | |
| Title | mDNS string-cache lookup matches on slot size, so a peer name aliases a shorter one and the response encoder writes past the packet | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: eclipse
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-10T15:50:38.472Z
Reserved: 2026-09-29T16:15:11.235Z
Link: CVE-2026-102715
Updated: 2026-09-29T18:41:59.861Z
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-09-29T18:17:10.780
Modified: 2026-11-04T14:17:19.013
Link: CVE-2026-102715
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-11-04T15:15:15Z