In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.
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History
Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-269 CWE-639 CWE-863 |
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| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: eclipse
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-15T12:11:37.639Z
Reserved: 2026-10-14T14:53:22.659Z
Link: CVE-2026-110724
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Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-10-15T13:17:12.973
Modified: 2026-10-15T14:41:34.110
Link: CVE-2026-110724
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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