PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2 | PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai |
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| Vendors & Products |
Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai |
Fri, 23 Oct 2026 12:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61. | |
| Title | PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-78 CWE-863 CWE-94 |
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| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-23T12:07:46.547Z
Reserved: 2026-06-24T01:45:48.697Z
Link: CVE-2026-57142
No data.
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-10-23T13:17:11.210
Modified: 2026-10-23T13:17:11.330
Link: CVE-2026-57142
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-10-23T13:45:17Z
Github GHSA