CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.

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History

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Naranor
Naranor agent-coderag
Vendors & Products Naranor
Naranor agent-coderag

Tue, 15 Sep 2026 18:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Tue, 15 Sep 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.
Title CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution
Weaknesses CWE-78
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-15T18:03:15.757Z

Reserved: 2026-06-24T18:49:56.209Z

Link: CVE-2026-57586

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-15T17:45:46.687Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-15T15:17:19.270

Modified: 2026-09-15T19:17:31.030

Link: CVE-2026-57586

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-17T19:59:01Z

Weaknesses