A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller.
The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django
ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist,
with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job
event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated
user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse
into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host
count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can
extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext
credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to
other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output
The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django
ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist,
with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job
event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated
user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse
into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host
count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can
extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext
credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to
other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output
No data.
| Package | CPE | Advisory | Released Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 | |||
| automation-controller-0:4.7.17-1.el9ap | cpe:/a:redhat:ansible_automation_platform:2.6::el9 | RHSA-2026:71113 | 2026-09-23T00:00:00Z |
No data.
Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
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References
History
Thu, 24 Sep 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The host_filter query parameter on the hosts list API is parsed into a raw Django ORM filter whose lookup path is validated only against a sensitive-field blocklist, with no authorization check on the database relations it traverses. Because job event and ad-hoc command output fields are not on that blocklist, an authenticated user holding only the Read role on an inventory can construct filters that traverse into the output of jobs they have no permission to view and use the returned host count as a boolean oracle. Using regular-expression lookups, the attacker can extract, character by character, the output (which routinely contains plaintext credentials, tokens, and command results) of jobs and ad-hoc commands belonging to other organizations, resulting in cross-tenant disclosure of job output | |
| Title | automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: host_filter SmartFilter ORM traversal exposes JobEvent/AdHocCommandEvent event_data and stdout to users without permission on the job, enabling blind character-by-character extraction of job output (cross-tenant information disclosure) | |
| First Time appeared |
Redhat
Redhat ansible Automation Platform |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| CPEs | cpe:/a:redhat:ansible_automation_platform:2.6::el9 | |
| Vendors & Products |
Redhat
Redhat ansible Automation Platform |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
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MITRE
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NVD
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Redhat
OpenCVE Enrichment
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Weaknesses