SigNoz versions from v0.98.0 up to (but not including) v0.143.0, when configured to use the opaque session tokenizer (which was not the default before v0.143.0), do not revoke a user's existing login sessions when the user's password is reset with a reset token (UpdatePasswordByResetPasswordToken, reachable via POST /api/v2/factor_password/reset) or when the user is deleted (DeleteUser, reachable via DELETE /api/v2/users/{id}). Neither code path calls the tokenizer's DeleteTokensByUserID, so cached tokens and identities are left in place. An attacker who already holds a session token for the account — for example from a stolen browser session or from a user being offboarded — retains the account's full access, up to administrator, after a password reset until the token reaches its configured maximum lifetime (30 days by default), and after user deletion until the token next rotates (30 minutes by default). This defeats password reset and user deletion as a means of terminating access. The issue is fixed in v0.143.0.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 24 Sep 2026 03:45:00 +0000
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Signoz
Signoz signoz |
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Signoz
Signoz signoz |
Thu, 24 Sep 2026 02:00:00 +0000
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| Description | SigNoz versions from v0.98.0 up to (but not including) v0.143.0, when configured to use the opaque session tokenizer (which was not the default before v0.143.0), do not revoke a user's existing login sessions when the user's password is reset with a reset token (UpdatePasswordByResetPasswordToken, reachable via POST /api/v2/factor_password/reset) or when the user is deleted (DeleteUser, reachable via DELETE /api/v2/users/{id}). Neither code path calls the tokenizer's DeleteTokensByUserID, so cached tokens and identities are left in place. An attacker who already holds a session token for the account — for example from a stolen browser session or from a user being offboarded — retains the account's full access, up to administrator, after a password reset until the token reaches its configured maximum lifetime (30 days by default), and after user deletion until the token next rotates (30 minutes by default). This defeats password reset and user deletion as a means of terminating access. The issue is fixed in v0.143.0. | |
| Title | SigNoz before 0.143.0 Insufficient Session Expiration Authentication Bypass | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-613 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: VulnCheck
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-24T01:53:04.486Z
Reserved: 2026-09-23T23:51:32.670Z
Link: CVE-2026-97056
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-24T02:16:54.500
Modified: 2026-09-24T02:16:54.500
Link: CVE-2026-97056
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-24T03:30:07Z
Weaknesses