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Search Results (6 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-62662 | 1 Pocket-id | 1 Pocket-id | 2026-11-05 | N/A |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 1.11.0 until 2.10.0, createTokenFromClientCredentials in backend/internal/service/oidc_service.go accepts the client-controlled resource parameter and embeds it directly in the access token aud claim without validating that the audience is registered or that the requesting client may access it. Any authenticated OIDC client can therefore obtain a Pocket ID-signed token naming another client or an arbitrary audience. The /api/oidc/introspect endpoint cannot distinguish the unauthorized token because it treats a token as active when the introspecting client's identifier matches the attacker-selected audience. In deployments where resource servers trust Pocket ID access tokens for service-to-service authorization, this bypasses audience-based access controls and can permit unauthorized data access or actions; deployments that do not use these tokens for resource-server authorization have no immediate exploitable impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.10.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-115770 | 1 Pocket-id | 1 Pocket-id | 2026-11-04 | 9.6 Critical |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55834 | 1 Pocket-id | 1 Pocket-id | 2026-08-28 | 4.3 Medium |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43983 | 1 Pocket-id | 2 Pocket-id, Pocket Id | 2026-05-13 | 8.1 High |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to your services. Prior to 2.6.0, The createTokenFromRefreshToken function (oidc_service.go) validates the refresh token's cryptographic integrity but does not re-validate the user's current authorization state before issuing new tokens. This allows (1) the client to refresh the token indefinitely after authorization revocation, (2) the refresh token to continue to work after the account is disabled, and (3) the token to work after the client is removed from the group. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.6.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28512 | 1 Pocket-id | 2 Pocket-id, Pocket Id | 2026-04-17 | 7.1 High |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to your services. From 2.0.0 to before 2.4.0, a flaw in callback URL validation allowed crafted redirect_uri values containing URL userinfo (@) to bypass legitimate callback pattern checks. If an attacker can trick a user into opening a malicious authorization link, the authorization code may be redirected to an attacker-controlled host. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28513 | 1 Pocket-id | 2 Pocket-id, Pocket Id | 2026-04-17 | 8.5 High |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to your services. Prior to 2.4.0, the OIDC token endpoint rejects an authorization code only when both the client ID is wrong and the code is expired. This allows cross-client code exchange and expired code reuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.0. | ||||
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