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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90339 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/syscall: Fix syscall skip handling for seccomp and ptrace After enabling GENERIC_ENTRY on PowerPC, syscall_enter_from_user_mode() returns -1 as a sentinel to signal that seccomp or ptrace has intercepted the syscall and already set a return value via syscall_set_return_value(). system_call_exception() was not handling this sentinel, and since -1UL is >= NR_syscalls, the code fell into the out-of-range path and returned -ENOSYS, overwriting the errno already placed in regs->gpr[3]. The naive fix of checking r0 == -1L before the NR_syscalls bounds check is ambiguous: a user legitimately calling syscall(-1) also produces r0 == -1L, and a tracer intercepting such a call would have its injected return value silently discarded. Fix this by introducing a thread flag that is set whenever syscall_set_return_value() explicitly updates the return value. In system_call_exception(), check and clear this flag before dispatching the syscall, and return the preset value directly when it is present. This ensures that an explicitly supplied return value always suppresses syscall execution, regardless of the syscall number. This handles all seccomp actions correctly: - SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE (no tracer), SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: all call syscall_set_return_value(), flag is set, injected value returned. - SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_KILL: call syscall_rollback() and deliver a signal; flag is not set, but the process is dying so the return value is irrelevant. The fix covers both ppc32 and ppc64 with no #ifdefs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90369 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: fix out-of-bounds access in mmio copy helpers mt76_mmio_write_copy() and mt76_mmio_read_copy() iterate up to ALIGN(len, 4), so a length that is not a multiple of four reads past the source buffer (write_copy) or writes past the destination (read_copy). Copy the aligned body in the loop and handle the remaining tail through a 4-byte bounce buffer, keeping the register access width unchanged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90372 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7915: avoid nss underflow in mt7915_mcu_get_sta_nss If a peer's VHT/HE MCS map has no supported spatial stream (all fields 0x3), the loop exits with nss == 0 and the function returned (u8)-1 (255), which was then written into the firmware sta_rec_bf beamforming fields. Clamp the result to 0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90379 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: Add PCIe AER handler support to prevent system crash When an AER error occurs and the bus is hung, the register reads return 0xFFFFFFFF, causing the DMA queue state to be corrupted and resulting in an invalid memory access when accessing q->desc[] or q->entry[]. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc01099eac0 pc : mt76_dma_add_buf+0x124/0x188 [mt76] lr : mt76_dma_rx_fill+0x11c/0x1d8 [mt76] sp : ffffffc016d9bbf0 x29: ffffffc016d9bc10 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffb7855e50b8 x25: ffffffb80d04f000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000ec0 x22: ffffffb796803648 x21: ffffffb796801f80 x20: ffffffb7968035f8 x19: 0000000000000ec0 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 000000004ec00000 x16: 000000000ec00000 x15: ffffffc01099eac0 x14: 000000004ec00000 x13: 00000000ffc5a000 x12: ffffffc016d9bc32 x11: 00000000ffffffff x10: 0000000000000002 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000b4ac x7 : 0000000000000a20 x6 : ffffffb6c1806400 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffffffb80d04f000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 000000000ec04000 x0 : ffffffb7968035f8 Call trace: mt76_dma_add_buf+0x124/0x188 [mt76 (HASH:1029 4)] mt76_dma_rx_reset+0xe8/0xfc [mt76 (HASH:1029 4)] mt7921_wpdma_reset+0x188/0x1b0 [mt7921e (HASH:ee48 5)] mt7921e_mac_reset+0x128/0x418 [mt7921e (HASH:ee48 5)] mt7921_mac_reset_work+0xac/0x1a8 [mt7921_common (HASH:f721 6)] process_one_work+0x188/0x514 worker_thread+0x12c/0x300 kthread+0x140/0x1fc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 Fix the invalid memory access by validating the DMA index read from the hardware before it is used as a queue index. An out-of-range value, such as the 0xFFFFFFFF returned while the bus is hung, is now clamped so it can no longer corrupt q->head or q->tail. In addition, check the bus_hung flag in mt7921_mac_reset_work() before attempting the reset sequence, reject MCU messages while the bus is hung, and install no-op bus operations when an unrecoverable AER error is detected, preventing further invalid hardware accesses. Due to hardware limitations - such as the lack of a connected hardware reset pin or the absence of host re-probe functionality - affected Wi-Fi devices may not fully recover to a normal operational state after certain errors, even with AER enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90407 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix overreads in ath11k_wmi_process_csa_switch_count_event() There is no policy entry for WMI_TAG_PDEV_CSA_SWITCH_COUNT_STATUS_EVENT, so the parse infrastructure does not enforce a minimum length for the event struct. Additionally, the num_vdevs field is taken directly from firmware and used as a loop bound over the vdev_ids array without checking that it fits within the TLV payload. Either condition can cause an out-of-bounds read. Add a TLV policy entry for WMI_TAG_PDEV_CSA_SWITCH_COUNT_STATUS_EVENT so the parse infrastructure enforces a minimum length for the fixed-size event struct. Add a helper ath11k_wmi_tlv_data_len() to recover the payload length of a parsed TLV from the header preceding its data pointer. Use it in ath11k_wmi_process_csa_switch_count_event() to bound num_vdevs before the loop. Compile tested only. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90419 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: prevent out-of-bounds read in super root block parsing super-root inode metadata size is trusted before nilfs_read_inode_common(). Reject super-root inode sizes whose computed on-disk footprint exceeds the filesystem block size. This prevents malformed filesystem images from making nilfs_read_inode_common() read past the end of the super-root block. [ryusuke: clarify the commit title] | ||||
| CVE-2026-90409 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: Add vm_bind region with kbo range overlap check When a VM is created, caller has to specify the range of the address space carve-out set aside for mapping kernel BO's. That means vm_bind mappings of UM-exposed BO's should not intersect with that region, but at the moment we're not checking this. At first, I thought of giving these values to drm_gpuvm_init() through its reserve_{offset, range} arguments, but it turns out that is meant for VM address spans that are not managed through the usual drm_gpuvm split/merge circuit, so storing the end of the user VA range at VM creation time and doing a quick check in the vm_bind ioctl path was the simplest workaround. The new check also makes sure vm_bind range doesn't overflow the size of a 64-bit unsigned integer. That was already being done further down the call stack inside drm_gpuvm_sm_map -> drm_gpuvm_range_valid, but it's best to fail early in the driver before GPUVM functions are invoked so that we won't waste time allocating vm_bind context resources. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90435 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx5: Fix integer overflow of user QP buffer size set_user_buf_size() computes the QP buffer size by left-shifting the user-supplied rq.wqe_cnt and rq.wqe_shift values as signed integers. A sufficiently large rq.wqe_cnt causes signed integer overflow, which is undefined behavior, and yields a small or negative buf_size, causing ib_umem_get() to map a buffer smaller than the hardware will actually write into. Replace the shifts and addition with check_shl_overflow() and check_add_overflow(), rejecting invalid user inputs. Moreover, guard the identical shift computing qp->sq.offset in _create_user_qp() before set_user_buf_size() is reached. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92477 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: debugfs: Reserve space for a string terminator ufs_saved_err_write() copies user input into a zero-initialized stack buffer and passes it to kstrtoint(). A write that fills the entire buffer overwrites its only terminator. Reject an input whose length leaves no room for the trailing NUL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92497 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: Avoid buffer overread in ath12k_wmi_op_rx() Currently, in ath12k_wmi_op_rx(), the firmware buffer is read without first verifying that the buffer has enough data to hold a header. This could result in a buffer overread. Update the logic to verify the buffer contains at least enough data to hold a wmi_cmd_hdr before reading from the buffer. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3 | ||||
| CVE-2026-93148 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject MEM_ALLOC BTF accesses past object bounds BTF struct walks relax the struct-size check for accesses through a trailing flexible array. That is valid for ordinary BTF type walking, but PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC values point to objects allocated with the static BTF type size. When walking a MEM_ALLOC object, reject the access before applying the flexible-array relaxation if the access range extends past the struct size. Apply the same policy to struct ID matching so kfunc and kptr type checks do not walk past the allocated object bounds either. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90425 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Require exactly one Stream ID for a vSID tegra241_vintf_init_vsid() maps a guest vSID to a single physical Stream ID taken from master->streams[0], and only warns when the device does not have exactly one stream. A device with several streams gets only its first one mapped, so a guest vSID invalidation cannot reach the others' ATC and IOTLB entries; a device with none makes master->streams a ZERO_SIZE_PTR, read out of bounds. Reject the mapping with -EOPNOTSUPP if master->num_streams is not one. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92525 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate num_sge/cur_sge before indexing wqe->dma.sge[] For a user QP, qp->sq.queue is a ring the application writes directly, so rxe_post_send() takes the is_user branch and only schedules send_task without validating the WQE. rxe_requester() consumes it in place via req_next_wqe() and calls copy_data(), which indexes &wqe->dma.sge[cur_sge] with the attacker-controlled num_sge/cur_sge. Only the kernel path bounds num_sge (validate_send_wr()); the user WQE is never checked, so a local unprivileged user can post a WQE with an out-of-range cur_sge or oversized num_sge and force an out-of-bounds read of the per-WQE sge array in copy_data() (vmalloc OOB read, local DoS). Bound num_sge to qp->sq.max_sge in rxe_requester() before use, the way get_srq_wqe() already guards SRQ entries, and bound cur_sge only when the WQE carries payload (dma.resid): copy_data() returns early on a zero-length copy before touching dma->sge[], so a zero-payload WQE -- the only kind a max_sge == 0 QP can post -- stays valid. Reproduced under KASAN; the vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_data() is gone. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93061 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpu: host1x: Avoid stack over-read in debug output helpers host1x_debug_output() and host1x_debug_cont() used vsnprintf(), which returns the length the formatted string would have reached with an unbounded buffer. That return value was passed straight to o->fn as the number of bytes to emit. This could cause a read past end of the output buffer if a call to host1x_debug_* produced a string longer than 256 bytes. This only affected the debugfs files as the printk debug sink ignores the number of bytes. In practice, this is very unlikely to occur. Fix by switching to vscnprintf(), which returns the number of bytes actually written. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93065 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: fix counter type in iwl_fwrt_dump_error_logs The loop counter 'count' was declared as u8 while num_pc is u32. If firmware advertises more than 255 PC entries the counter wraps back to zero and the loop never terminates potentially causing an infinite loop or reading past the allocated pc_data array. Change the declaration to u32 to match num_pc. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93067 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/bridge: tc358767: clamp the reported AUX read size to the request tc_aux_transfer() clamps an AUX read to the payload limit: size_t size = min_t(size_t, DP_AUX_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES - 1, msg->size); After the transfer it replaces size with the byte count the controller reports in AUX_BYTES: if (size) size = FIELD_GET(AUX_BYTES, auxstatus); AUX_BYTES is GENMASK(15, 8), so it can be up to 255. Nothing clamps it back to the request. tc_aux_read_data() reads that many bytes into the 16-byte auxrdata stack buffer, then copies them into the caller buffer. A reported count of 255 makes the read run to 256 bytes and overruns both. The controller should never report more than it was asked to transfer, so this is defense in depth rather than a live hole. The reported count is only lightly trusted, and the check is cheap. Clamp it back to the request, the same way ti-sn65dsi86 does in commit aca58eac52b8 ("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Never store more than msg->size bytes in AUX xfer"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-93078 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header cxlctl_set_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even the fwctl_rpc_cxl_out header. With out_len == 0 , kvzalloc() returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequent rpc_out->size = 0 then writes through the poison pointer. Reject requests whose output buffer can't hold the response header, before allocating. The Set Feature reply carries no payload, so the header is all that is required. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92498 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: avoid buffer overreads in WMI event handlers The following WMI event handlers currently read from the event buffer without first verifying that the message was large enough to hold the expected event: ath6kl_wmi_scan_complete_rx() ath6kl_wmi_addba_req_event_rx() ath6kl_wmi_delba_req_event_rx() Add length checks to prevent overread. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92523 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/nldev: validate dynamic counter attribute length RDMA_NLDEV_ATTR_STAT_HWCOUNTERS is a nested attribute whose children are consumed directly with nla_get_u32(). The top-level policy validates only the container, so it does not establish the fixed shape of each child. Require every child payload to be exactly one u32 before reading it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93079 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer cxlctl_get_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write cxl_mbox_get_feat_in.count bytes into rpc_out->payload, which is a separate user-controlled value. Nothing bounds count against out_len, so a small out_len with a large count overflows the kvzalloc()'d buffer. A heap OOB write reachable from FWCTL_RPC. Reject requests where count exceeds the available payload room, before allocating. | ||||